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Introduction 
1.1  Background 
The  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  of  the  European  Economic 
Community  (EC)  has  been  the  subject  of  controversy since  its  inception. 
Nonetheless,  the  cereals policy would  have  to  be  considered  a  success, 
with  the  exception  of  consumer  ~fices,  given  the  objectives  of  the  CAP 
contained  in  the Treaty of  Rome: 
(a)  to  increase  agricultural  productivity; 
(b)  to  ensure  a  fair  standard  of  living  for  the  agricultural 
community; 
(c)  to  stabilize markets; 
(d)  to assure  the availability of  supplies;  and, 
(e)  to  ensure  that  supplies  reach  consumers  at  reasonable 
prices. 
Indeed,  the  CAP  has  been  so  successful  in fulfilling objective  (d)  that 
attention has  turned  away  from  the  problem of  self-sufficiency to  one  of 
surplus  disposal  and  budgetary costs. 
This  paper  concentrates  primarily on  the  EC  wheat  sector  where 
price  policies  have  resulted  in a  large  exportable  surplus.  These 
surpluses  are  disposed  of using  export  restitutions  (subsidies)  which 
have  expanded  rapidly over  the  1970's  and  early 1980's.  As  shown  1n 
Table  1.1,  the  EC  was  a  net  importer of wheat  until  1973/74.  However, 
the  EC's  net  exports  of wheat  and  flour  exceeded  10  mmt  by  1980/81,  due 
in  part  to  the  entry of  the  United  Kingdom  into  the  EC,  and  the 
continuing  improvement  in wheat  yields.  In  1984/85,  the  combination  of 
increased  wheat  area  and  yields resulted  in the  EC  replacing  Canada  as 
the  world's  second  largest  wheat  exporter.  Nonetheless,  the  EC 
continues  to  import  high quality wheat  to blend with their domestically 
produced  lower  quality wheat.  Imports  of wheat  by  the  EC  have  declined 
from  nearly  10  mmt  in  1970/71  to  an  estimated  2.5 mmt  in 1984/85. 
Increased  self-sufficiency in the  EC  is also occurring  for  coarse 
grains  (table  1.2).  Between  the  early 1960's  and  1975/76  the  EC's 
coarse  grain  net  imports  were  quite stable averaging about  15 mmt  per 
year.  Following  an  increase  in net  imports  in  1976/77  (due  to  the 
drought  in  Europe)  net  imports  have  continued to decline with  the  EC 
forecast  to  become  a  net  exporter of  2.4 mmt  of  coarse grains  in  1984/85 
(U.S.D.A.,  1984a). 
The  U.S.  has  viewed  the  emergence  of  the  EC  as  a  major  whe~r 
eXporter  with considerable  alarm and  increasingly  hostile  rhetoric. 
The  United  States perceive  the use  of export  subsidies  by  the  EC  as  an Table  1.1:  Uheot  Supply  and  Disposition,  European  Community-l0,  1970/71-1984/85,  mmt. 
Crop  Year  Trade  Year  (July-June) 
Crop  Ye/Jr 
Beginning  a/  Food  Feed 
Export  9~/ 
Encling  Net 
Import ~/  Exports!?.!  August  Production  Imports- Demand  Demand  Inventory  Exports 
-------.-----.---.---------------- .. _  .... _-------_._--------------------------
1970/71  36.72  12.18  30.09  12.6  5.72  5.1,9  -6.46  9.5  3.4 
1971/72  42.07  11.24  30.8"  12.1  8.08  7.00  -2.36  6.8  ',.2 
1972/73  43.37  12.05  30.14  14.6  11.88  5.82  -0.16  7.0  6.0 
1973/74  43.13  12.13  30.14  11.8  11.66  7.29  -0.47  5.3  5.2 
1974/75  47.66  9.90  30.52  12.3  12.26  9.73  2.35  4.9  6.9 
1975/76  40.18  11.95  30.58  9.4  1  11.51  7.53  2.55  5.4  8.6 
1976/77  41.46  9.65  30.59  9.9  10.90  7.04  1.25  4.4  5.1 
N 
1977/78  40.20  12.51  30.57  10.7  12.64  6.15  0.13  5.5  5.0 
1978/79  50.26  10.64  30.79  11.9  15.30  9.00  4.66  4.6  8.8 
1979/80  48.84  10.86  31.02  12.3  17.50  7.77  6.64  5.3  10.4 
1980/81  55.07  10.31  31.08  12.8  20.70  8.78  10.38  4.5  14.7 
1981/82  54.40  11.20  30.80  13.7  22.10  7.80  10.90  4.7  15.5 
1982/83  59.80  9.50  29.30  15.3  21.20  11.20  11. 70  3.9  15.6 
1983/84£/  59.10  10.00  29.50  19.7  22.70  8.30  12.70  3.6  15.4 
1964/85£/  76.40  9.50  30.70  21.3  25.60  16.60  16.10  2.5  17.5 
.--------.---~------ ----
a/  Includes  intra-EC  trade 
b/  Excludes  intra-EC  trade 
c/  Pre I iminary 
Source:  U.S.  Dept.  of Agriculture.  Grllins.  ForeiRn  Agriculturnl  Circular,  various  issues. .  , 
TUble  1.2:  Coarse  Gruins  Supply  and  Disposition,  European  Community-l0,  1970/71-1984/85,  mmt. 
Crop  Year 
Deg inn'ing 















































a/  Includes  intra-EC  trade 
b/  Excludes  intra-EC  trade 



















































c/  July-June  through  1978/79,  October-September  thereafter 




































Trade  years..! 
ImportsE.!  ExportsE.! 
NA  NA 
IIA  IIA 
IIA  NA 
IIA  lIA 
IIA  tlA 
tlA  NA 
23.2  4.0 
14.8  5.5 
13.5  5.5 
13.3  5.0 
11.1  5.6 
8.8  4.1 
6.5  5.2 
5.9  3.5 
4.9  6.0 
Source:  U.S,  Dept,  of  Agriculture.  Grains.  Foreign  Agricultural  Circular,  various  issues. 
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unfair  trade  practice,  and  point  out  that  the  EC  policies  have 
contributed  to world  price  instability.  Secretary  Block  has  argued  that 
the  U.S.  may  have  to deviate  from  its "free market"  stance  and  engage  in 
a  short-run  tra~1 war  if that  is what  it takes  to  achieve  the principle 
of  free markets.  More  recently,  Senator  Quayle  has  indicated  that  the 
U.S.  may  have  to resort  to  explicit  export  subsidies if othe~/countries 
are unwilling  to dismantle  their restrictive trade practices. 
During  most  of  the  1980's  the  EC  has  faced  a  budgetary  problem with 
the  costs  of  the  CAP  rising more  rapidly  than  revenues.  Thi-s  has 
resulted  in  (1)  support  price  increases  lower  than  they would  have  been 
otherwise;  (2)  a  policy to  impose  production  quotas  on  the dairy sector; 
(3)  a  delay  in  support  payments  to  pr3?ucers;  and,  (4)  the  introduction 
of  guarantee  thresholds  for  cereals.  At  this  time  it is difficult  to 
foresee  how  successful  the  EC's  efforts  will  be  in  limiting 
expenditures;  and  what  their  impacts will be  on  exports  and  world 
prices. 
Canada  has  a  large  stake  in  the  evolution of  the  EC  from  an 
importer  of  cereals  to  a  major  export  competitor.  Not  only has  Canada 
lost  sales  to what  was  historically one  of  its most  important  markets 
fdr  high  quality wheat,  but  the  EC  is now  competing directly with Canada 
for  third  country markets.  In addition,  a  EC-US  trade  confrontation 
using  explicit  export  subsidies would  damage  Canadian  export markets  and 
producer  welfare.  Export  subsidies  lower  the world market  price for  the 
commodity  being  subsidized which would  be  passed  on  directly to Canadian 
producers.  In  a  battle between  the  EC  and  U.S.  treasuries,  the Canadian 
cereal  producer would  most  likely suffer the greatest  loss. 
1.2  Objectives 
Given  the  emergence  of  the  EC  as  a  significant  wheat  exporter, 
their  internal budgetary problems,  and  their trade  confrontation  with 
the  U.S.,  it  is  important  for  Canada  to understand  the  effects  of 
alternative  policy  scenarios  that  have  or may  be  implemented  in  the 
future.  While  there have  been  a  number  of  studies  analyzing different 
aspects  of  the  EC's  economic  policies,  they  are  based  on  assumed 
(synthetic)  values  for  the relevant  supply,  demand  and  policy parameters 
(Buckwell  et al.;  Anderson  and  6Ters;  Rayner  and  Reed;  Paarlberg  and 
Sharples;  Josling  and  Pearson).  Since  the evaluation of  any  policy 
change  depends  crucially on  the values of  the  assumed  parameters of  the 
economic  system  being  studied,  one  objective of this research  is  to 
provide  reasonable  estimates  of7/the  various  parameters  needed  to 
evaluate  the  EC's  wheat  policy.  Special features  of the  EC  wheat 
~rket incorporated  in the econometric model  representation  include  two-
way  trade;  imperfect  substitution  in  demand  between  imported  and 
domestically  produced  supplies;  distinction between  the threshold price 
and  intervention price;  and,  imperfect  price transmission between market 
and  policy prices.  .. 
Following  the  specification  and  estimation  of  the  model, 
multipliers  are  presented  to  illustrate how  the  EC's  wheat  sector 
responds  to  various  exogenous  shocks  including  changes  in  (1)  the 5 
intervention price;  (2)  the  threshold  price;  (3)  the value  of  the  U.S. 
dollar  relative to  the  ECU;  and,  (4)  the  excess  demand  for  Community 
wheat. 
In  the  future,  it is proposed  to  use  the model  to  evaluate  a  number 
of  policies  which  could  reduce  the  EC's  expenditures  in  the  cereal 
sector  including production controls,  continued  domestic  price supports 
but  without  export  subsidies,  and  the abolition of the  "green" rate  of 
exchange.  In addition,  the  economic  rationale of  the  EC's  wheat  policy 
will  be  evaluated  in further research,  and  the  EC  wheat  model  will  be 
incorporated  into  a  larger multicountry model  of world  wheat  trade  in 
order  to  evaluate a  larger range  of policy  issues at  the  international 
level. 
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An  Overview  of  the  European  Community's  Cereal  Policy 
2.1  Introduction 
A  brief overview of  the  pricing  structure of  the  EC  cereal  policy 
(including  the  special exchange  rate or monetary  compensatory  amounts) 
is  provided  as  background  to understand  the model  developed  in  section 
3.  Readers  are  advised  to  consult Harris,  Swinbank  and  Wilkinson; 
Fennell,  and  the  CAP  Monitor  for more  detailed  information. 
2.2  Price  Structure 
Three  principle policy  instruments  are used  in the  EC  wheat  market 
to  maintain  a  domestic  producer  price  support  (intervention price): 
(a)  a  variable  levy which  raises  the  lower  world  price  to  a 
higher  import  (threshold)  price; 
(b)  obligatory  purchases  of  intervention  (public)  stocks  by 




for  these 
variable export  restitution  (subsidy)  payments  to dispose 
of wheat  surplus  to  domestic  requirements. 
producer  support  (intervention and  reference)  prices  are  1n 
wheat  reflecting domestic  quality  d~1ferentials.  The  values 
prices  1n  the  1984/85  crop  year are: 
Threshold  price  254.05  ecu 
Reference price  (medium  quality)  213.14  ecu 
Reference price  (minimum  quality}  195.52  ecu 
Intervention price  182.73  ecu 
Figure  2.1  shows  the evolution  of  thre§?old,  minimum  quality 
reference  and  intervention prices  S1nce  1967/68. 
The  intervention  price for wheat  sets  the m1n1mum  internal  price 
within  the  EC  and,  when  convYored at green rates,  is  common  across  the 
individual  member  countries.  The  intervention price  is  maintained 
through  intervention  purchases.  Wheat  purchased  by  the  EC  is  either 
~old  back  onto  the domestic  market  (when  domestic  prices  rise)  or 
exported,  usually  using  export restitutions,  since  domestic  cerrft 
prices  in the  EC  are normally above  world  market  prices  (figure 2.2). 
Basically,  the  refunds  serve to bridge the gap  between  the f.o.b.  price 
of  EC  cereals  in export position,  normally Rouen  for wheat,  and  the 
f.o.b.  prices  of other exporters,  usually soft winter wheat  from  u.S. 
Gulf  ports  and  Argentina wheat.  Export  subsidies  for  cereals represent 
a  major  cost  for  the  Community,  averaging  1.8 billion ECU  between  1980 







Figure  2.1:  Intervention,  Reference  and  Threshold  Price in  the 
European  Community,  1967/68  to  1983/8~.  ECU/mt.' 
1972 
000 - Threshold  price 
+++  - Reference  price 
¢<>O  - Intervention price 
1977  1982 
Year 






Figure  2.2:  Wheat  Price Comparisons,  1961/68  to  1983/84,  ECU/mt. 
40.
1967  1972  1977  1982 
000 - EC  Intervention price for wheat 
000 - EC  Import  price for  wheat 
Year 
+++  - U.S.  Export  price for  No.  I,  S.R.W.  wheat,  Gulf  Ports. 
co 
1987 
, .  .  . 9 
The  threshold price  (basis  Rotterdam)  is  the m1n1mum  price at which 
third1270untry  wheat  can  be  imported  and  is maintained  by  a  variable 
levy.  The  variable  import  levy  for  wheat  is based  on  the  lowest 
foreign  offer price to  the  EC,  basis Rotterdam.  After adjusting  the 
offer prices  for  quality differentials,  and  converting the  prices  from 
U.S.  dollars  to  ECU's,  the  lowest  C.I.F.  price  in  ECU/tonne  is 
determined.  This  price is then  subtractr~/from the  threshold  price to 
determine  the  import  levy  in ECU's/tonne.  Levies  represent  a  source 
of  income  to  the  EC  averaging  1.44 billion  ECU  per  year,  for  all 
products,  during  1980  to  1982. 
The  variable  import  levy  is designed  to keep  third country  exports 
from  undercutting  the  EC's  price  support  system.  However,  during  the 
commodity  boom  years  1973-1975  world  grain prices at  times  rose  above 
the  EC's  threshold  prices.  In  this  situation  according  to  the 
principles  of  the  EC  grain market,  import  subsidies  should  have  been 
introduced,  but  they  were not  because  of  the  financial  implications 
(Toepfer).  Instead  an  export  levy  (tax)  was  applied  to exports  in order 
to  keep  domestic  prices  from  increasing  in  line  with  world  price 
changes. 
Reference  prices  for  wheat  of  breadmaking  quality were  introduced 
in  1976/77  at  the  same  time  as  the "silo system".  The  purpose  of  the 
reference  price  is to  provide  a  higher  level of  support  for  wheat  of 
breadmaking  quality  than  for  feed  wheat.  The  purchase of  grain  by 
intervention agencies  at  the reference price,  providing it meets  minimum 
quality  requirements,  is restricted to the first  three months  of  the 
crop  year  and  there  have  been  limits  on  the  quantities  purchased. 
Beginning  in  1981/82  two  quality  standards  were  established  for 
breadmaking  wheat  of medium  and  minimum  quality.  In  the model  it  is 
assumed  that  imported wheat  competes  against  domestic  wheat  priced  at 
the minimum  quality reference price  (see  section 2.2). 
Prior  to  the  introduction of  the "silo system"  in  1976/77  the 
intervention price for wheat  was  above  those  for  barley and  corn,  e.g., 
13.5 percent  higher  than  barley and  21.7  percent higher  than  for  corn  in 
1975/76.  The  result of this policy was  to  encourage  the  production of 
high  yielding  feed  quality wheats,  which  had  to  be  exported,  while 
discouraging  the  production  of  coarse  grains  which  the  EC  has 
traditionally imported.  Consequently,  in 1976/77  the  intervention price 
for  feed  quality wheat  was  lowered  and  equated  to  the  intervention price 
for  barley.  The  intervention price for  corn remained  below  those  for 
barley  and  wheat until 1978/79  when  the  intervention  prices  for  all 
three grains were  equated.  The  policy of  equal  intervention prices  for 
feed  wheat,  barley  and  corn appears  to  be  a  permanent  policy  change, 
~onsequently, one pricing decision sets  the  price support  level for  most 
of  the  cereals  sector. 
2.3  Monetary  Compensatory Amounts  (MCA's)  .. 
Although  the agricultural policy of  the  EC  is referred to  as  the 
"Common  Agricultural Policy"  support  prices  for  cereals have  generally 
been  different  in  the  various  member  countries  and  these  price 10 
differences  have  been maintained  through  the use  of  MCA's.14/ 
The  calculation and  application of  MCA's  can  be  complex,  however, 
the  basic principle  is that  MCA's  are  a  means  of mainta1n1ng  different 
price  support  levels across  member  countries.  The  final market  price 
received  by  producers  is  influenced  by  the  MCAs  which are  applied  to 
both  intervention  and  threshold prices  in  individual Member  Countries 
(Ritson  and  Tangermann).  MCAs  are taxes  or  subsidies  levied on  intra-EC 
and  extra-EC agricultural  product  trade and  their  levels  depend  on  the 
difference  between  central exchange  rates  and  the  representative  or 
"green"  exchange  rate  used  in conducting  agricultural  trade.  This 
latter  green  exchange rate  is established  by  national  governments  {at 
their  discretion)  and  differs  from  the official rates of  exchange.  A 
country  whose  currency has  appreciated  pays  the  compensatory  amounts  on 
exports  and  levies  them  on  imports.  The  opposite  occurs  for  a  country 
whose  currency has  depreciated. 
The  welfare  impacts  of MCA's,  on  member  countries  depend  on  whether 
the  country  is  an  importer or  an  exporter  and  whether  their currency  is 
revaluing  or  devaluing  (Ritson  and  Tangermann).  Two  different 
situations are  illustrated  in  figure  2.3.  Country  one  is depicted  as  a 
weak  currency  (green rate  < market  rate)  exporting  country.  The  fact 
that  the  good  is valued at  Pg,  using  green rates,  instead  of  Pm,  using 
market  rates  means  that  consumers  would  lose  PgPmBC,  producers 
would  gain PgPmED,  and  there would  be  a  net  gain to  the  country of  CBED 
from  a  movement  to market  rates of  exchange. 
Country  two  is  a  strong  currency  (green  rate  >  market  rate) 
importing nation  so  prices  converted at green rates  (Pg)  are  above  what 
they  would  be  if converted at market  rates  (Pm).  In  this  situation 
consumers  gain  PmPgEF,  and  producers  lose  PmPgBA  from  a  move  to market 
rates of  exchange.  Again,  there  is  a  net gain to  the country,  equal  to 
ABEF.  With  the principles clearly established  the  chart  given  below 
shows  the  economic  impacts  of MCA's  in  four  possible situations. 
Exporting  nation: 
green rate > market  rate 
green rate < market  rate 
Importing  nation: 
green rate  > market  rate 
green rate  < market  rate 
Impact  of moving  from green rates 
to market  rates  of  exchange 
Consumers  Producers  Net  Change 
gain  lose  negative 
lose  gain  positive 
gain  lose  positive 
lose  gain  negative 
.. 
Clearly,  a  comprehensive  evaluation of  the welfare  impacts  of MCA's 
in  the  EC  would  have  to be  conducted  for  every  country  and  all 11 
Fi~ure 2.3 
Welfare  Impacts  of  ~CA's for  a  Weak  Currency Exporting Nation 
and  a  Stron~ Currency  Importing  ~ation 
Country One  - Exporting  Country - Green rate less 





Country  Two  - Importing  Country - Greenrate greater 
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commodities.  The  scope  of this  study  has  been  limited  by  estimating 
aggregate  supply  and  demand  curves  for  the  EC  as  a  whole.  Because  of 
this it is  impossible  to use  the model  to  eva1uate1S?e  impact  of  changes 
in  green  rates  on  individual member  countries.  The  model  can, 
however,  be  used  to  analyze  the  impact  on  the  Community's  aggregate 
supply  and  demand  quantities  by  simply replacing  the green  rates  of 
exchange  with  the  market  rates  in the  member  countries  farm  price 
linkage  equations  (see  equations  3.23  to  3.38).  It should  be  noted  that 
there  is no  requirement  for  MCA's  to  sum  to  zero  across  the  Community, 
and  between  1980  and  1982  Community  expenditures  on MCA's  averaged  283.2 
million  ECU's  per  year  (Commission  of  the  European  Communities). 
As  a  result  of  the  breakdown  1n  the  common  pr1c1ng  provisions  of 
the  CAP  the  farm  prices  in the different member  countries  are  dependent 
on  (1)  the  announced  "common"  ECU  support  price;  and,  (2)  the green rate 
used  to  translate  the  common  price  into their  own  currency.  Green  rates 
are  established  by  each  individual  member  country  with  the  only 
constraint  on  a  member  country  in setting its green  rate  being  the 
convention  that  green rate changes  can  only be  made  to  reduce  MCA's, 
e.g.,  green  rate  changes  must  move  national prices closer  to  the  common 
price  level  calculated at market  exchange  rates. 
With  the  entry of  the  United  Kingdom,  Denmark  and  Ireland  into  the 
EC  in  1973,  special measures  were  introduced  to provide  for  a  period of 
transition  from  the  individual countries  cereal policy,  prior to entry, 
to  the  common  agricultural po1jcy.  This  transition period  lasted five 
years  and  was  accomplished  through the use  of accessionary  compensatory 
amounts  (ACA's).  The  ACA's  were  subtracted  from  the  common  support 









3.1  outlines  the  econometric model  of  the  EC  wheat  sector 
in  the  following  section.  The  model  contains  44  endogenous 
which  are  explained  using  27  behavioral  equations,  16 
and  one market-clearing condition. 
The  model  contains  five blocks  of equations.  In  the  supply block 
the  area  of wheat  harvested  and  total wheat  production are  determined. 
In  the  demand  block,  the disappearance  of  wheat  into  food  use.  feed  use 
and  carry-over stocks  is estimated.  In addition,  the  share of  total 
food  use  from  supplies  of  imported  wheat  is  determined.  Total  wheat 
imports,  total wheat  exports  and  community  net  exports  of wheat  can  then 
be  calculated using  identities.  The  third block of  equations  are  used 
to  determine  the values  of  the policy  variables.  The  intervention, 
reference  and  threshold prices  for  wheat  and  the  threshold  price  for 
barley  are  determined  using behavioral  equations,  while  the  barley 
intervention price,  export  subsidies  and  levy  income  are determined  from 
identities.  The  fourth  block of equations  is used  to  determine  the  farm 
prices  of  wheat  and  barley in the  individual  member  countries.  In 
addition,  the U.S.  export  price for wheat  is  determined  from  the market 
clearing  (excess  demand  equals  excess  supply)  condition.  The  EC  import 
price  for  wheat  is calculated using  an  identity.  The  final  block  of 
equations  is used  to calculate  indices  of  the  individual member  country 
prices  for  use  in  the  aggregate  supply  and  demand  "equations  discussed 
earlier. 
The  model,  as  specified  in  the  next  section,  follows  rather 
standard model  building practices  (Labys).  It does,  however,  represent 
an  addition  to  the  growing  body of agricultural  commodity  models  which 
treat  policy  variables  as  being  determined  endogenously  (Meilke  and 
Griffith;  Sarris  and  Freebairn;  de  Gorter).  It should  also be  noted 
that  the  model,  with  the  exception of  the  Community's  government 
inventory  relation,  is recursive  and  hence with  the  exception of  this 
one  equt~fon, can  be  appropriately  estimated  using  ordinary  least 
squares. 
3.2  Aggregation 
The  supply and  demand  quantities  explained  in this model 
the  ECIO  as  published  by  the U.S.  Department  of Agriculture. 
~ll macroeconomic  variables  and  farm prices are for  the  EC-9. 
variable definitions,  the mnemonics  used,  and  data  sources are 
Appendix I. 
are  for 
Data  for 
Complete 
given  in 
The  aggregation  of variables across  EC  member  countries,  in  a 
manner  to  permit  consistent estimation of aggregate  supply and"  demand 
functions  is handled  in the  following  fashion.  Consider  the aggregation 
of  two  countries  demand  functions  where  the  countries differ  only  in 
size,  with  country  two  being  (k)  times  larger or  smaller  than  country Table  3.1:  An  Overview  of  the  Hodel 
Endogenous  Variables  Exogenous  Variables 
A.  Supply  Variables 
1.  Area  harvested  (AWIt) 
2.  Total  production  (QHIl) 
B.  Demand  Variables 
3.  Food  whea t  consumpt ion  (mmFO) 
4.  Feed  wheat  consumption  (D\~IFE) 
5.  Import  share  of  food  wh~at  consumption  (SItEC) 
6.  Imports  of  wheat  (IlIIm) 
7.  Commerc ial wheat  inventory  (cnlll) 
8.  Government  wheat  inventory  (GHm) 
9.  Exports  of  wheat  (EX\m) 
10.  Net  exports  of  wheat  (tmxlm) 
C.  Policy  Variables 
11.  \-Iheat  intervention  price  (PWIlItI) 
12.  Wheat  threshold  price  (p\mTII) 
13.  "'heat  reference price  (P~lIIRE) 
14.  Barley  intervention price  (pnAIH) 
15.  Barley  threshold  price  (PBATII) 
16.  Export  subsidies  (ECSUB) 
17.  Levy  income  (WVYIIIC) 
18.  Net  revenue  (NETREV) 
D.  Price  Variables 
19.  Netherlands  farm  price of  wheat  (FPlm.NE) 
20.  Netherlands  farm  price  of  barley  (FPM.NE) 
21.  France  farm  price of  wheat  (FP\-III.FR) 
22.  France  farm  price of  barley  (FPnA.FR) 
23.  I~est  Germany  farm  price of  wheat  (FPlm.WG) 
24.  Hest  Germany  farm  price of  barley  (FPBA.HG) 
25.  Italy  farm  price of  ,~heat  (FPllII.IT) 
26.  Italy  farm  price of  barley  (FPBA.IT) 
27.  Belgium-I.ux  farm  price  of  wheat  (FPIIII.BE) 
1.  Indices  of  production  costs  (CSTIH) 
2.  Index  of  real  personal  consumption  expenditures  (DY) 
3.  Population  (POP) 
4.  Consumer  price  index  (CPI) 
5.  lIog  prices  (FPIIG) 
6.  Denaturing  premium  (DENAT) 
7.  Exchange  rate  (ECU's/US$)  (EXCIIRECU) 
8.  Index  of  green  rates  of  exchange  (EXRGR) 
9.  Dummy  variable  for  introduction of  silo 
system  (D7682) 
10.  Coefficient of  equivalence  for  14  percent 
protein  spring  wheat  (CEQUIV) 
11.  Netherlands,  green  rate  of  exchange  (EXRGR.NE) 
12.  France,  green  rate of  exchange  (EKRGR.FR) 
13.  \-lest  Germany,  green  rate of  exchange  (EXRGR.WG) 
14.  Italy,  green  rate  of  exchange  (EXRGR.IT) 
15.  Belgium-Lux,  green  rate  of  exchange  (EXRGR.BE) 
16.  United  Kingdom,  green  rate of  exchange  (EXRGR.UK) 
17.  Denmark,  green  rate  of  exchange  (EXRGR.DE) 
18.  Ireland,  green  rate.of  exchange  (EXRGR.ID) 
...... 
~ 
19.  United  Kingdom,  wheat  (ACA.UK)  and  barley  (ACABA.UK)  ACA's Table  3.1  continued 
28.  Belgium-Lux  farm  price of  barley  (FPBA.BE)  20.  Denmark,  wheat  (ACA.DE)  and  barley  (ACABA.DE)  ACA's 
29.  United  Kingdom  farm  price of  wheat  (FPHH.UK)  21.  Ireland,  wheat  (ACA.ID)  and  barley  (ACABA.ID)  ACA's 
30.  United  Kingdom  farm  price of  barley  (FPBA.UK) 
31.  Denmark  farm  price of  wheat  (FP\m.DE) 
22.  Margin  between  EC  wheat  import  price  and  U.S.  wheat 
export  price  (~mIHP) 
32.  Denmark  farm  price of  barley  (FPBA.DE) 
33.  Ireland  farm  price of  wheat  (FPHII.ID) 
34.  Ireland  farm  price of  barley  (FPBA.ID) 
35.  EC,  import  price  for  wheat,  c.i.£.  (nIP~m) 
36.  U.S.,  export  price  for  No.2  soft  red  winter 
wheat,  Gulf  ports  (EXPllH) 
E.  Identities 
37.  Index  of  farm  wheat  prices  deflated  by  the  cost  of  production  requisites  weighted  by  production 
shares  (SPlm) 
38.  Index  of  farm  barley prices deflated  by  the  cost  of  production  requisites  weighted  by  production  shares 
(SPBA) 
39.  Index  of  the  weighted  sum  of  farm  and  threshold  wheat  prices deflated  by  the  consumer  price  index 
weighted  by  consumption  shares  (CPHH) 
40.  Index  of  farm  wheat  prices divided  by  intervention wheat  prices  weighted  by  production  shares  (PINV). 
41.  Index  of  wheat  threshold  prices  divided  by  wheat  reference  ~rices weighted  by  consumption  shares  (PTIIREF) 
42.  IU.dex  of  farm  wheat  prices  divided  by  hog  prices  weighted  by  production  shares  (WPIIP) 
43.  Index  of  farm  barley  prices  divided  by  hog  prices  weighted  by  production  shares  (BPIIP) 
44.  Rest  of  world  excess  demand  (EDROW). 
f-' 
V1 one.  Demand  in 
functions  of  real 
DY2/CPI2)  in  each 
16 
countriei  one  (D  )  and  two  (D2) 
prices  (Pl /CPI1,  P2/CPI2)  and  real 
country  (equat~ons 3.1  and  3.2). 
are  specified  as 
incomes  (DYl /CPI1, 
The  two  countries  are  identical except  that  Dl  = kD2• 
two  demand  functions  together  (DT)  gives, 
Adding  ~he 
Factoring  out  the  common  slope  term gives, 
Equation  (3.4)  shows  that  aggregate  demand  can be  estimated  using 
weighted  averages  of price and  income  variables  for  the various  member 
countries.  The  weights  used  in  constructing  these variables are  either 
1968  to  1981  production or  consumption  shares,  whichever  is  most 
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In  situations where  a  price or  income  variable,  which  is measured 
~n  domestic  currency units,  is deflated  by  a  general price  index  the 
price  and  income  variables  are also  put  in  index  form  before  the 
variable  is  deflated.  This  avoids  the  problem of aggregating"  prices 
measured  in different  currency units. 17 
3.3  ,Equation  Estimates 
The  next  five  sections discuss  the  specification  and  estimation 
results  for  the  behavioral  equations,  dealing  in  turn with  the  supply 
block,  demand  block,  policy block,  price block,  identities  and  the 
linkage  to  the  rest  of  the world.  All  of  the  equations  have  been 
estimated  using  ordinary  least  squares  or nonlinear  least  squares  to 
correct  for  a~tocorrelation  (Fair),  with  the  coefficient  of 
determination  (R),  Durbin-Watson  statistic  (D.W.),  correction  for 
autocorrelation  (RHO)  and  sample  period  given  below  each  equation. 
Student  t-values are given  in parentheses  and  elasticities,  calculated 
at mean  values,  below  the  estimated  coefficients. 
3.3.1  Supply  Block 
The  quantity  of  wheat  produced  in  the  EC  is  determined  by 
estimating  area  response  and  a  total production  function.  The  area 
planted  to  wheat  in the  EC  has  been  fairly stable since  1960,  varying 
from  a  low  of  10.977 million hectares  in 1977  to  an  estimated  13.4 
million hectares  in 1984.  The  area'sown  to  wheat  (AWH)  has,  however, 
responded  to  changes  in  the  lagged  deflated  farm price of wheat  (SPWH) 
and  the  lagged  deflated  farm  price of barley  (SPBA),  where  both prices 
are  deflated  by  an  index of  prices  paid  by  farmers  for  production 
requisites. 
'Because  the  Community  raises both winter  and  spring wheat  the  price 
of  wheat  lagged  both one  and  two  years  was  included  in the area response 
equation  (3.5). 
(3.5)  AWH  = 
t-value 
elasticity 
R2  = 0.66 
4.28 
(0.43 ) 
+  3.27  SPWH(-l) 
0.34) 






D.W.  = 2.70 
[0.67] 
+  0.065  Trend 
(0.79) 
Sample  = 1964/65  - 1981/82 
The  Community  also raises  spring  and winter barley but when  the  barley 
price  lagged  two  years  was  included  in equation  (3.5)  it entered with  a 
very  low  t-value  and  was  excluded  from  the  final  specification. 
Equation  (3.5)  indicates  that wheat  area  is quite  responsive  to  price 
changes  with a  direct price elasticity,  in the first year  following  a 
price change,  of 0.34 and  in the  second  year  of 0.67.  The  cross  price 
elasticity with respect  to  the barley price  is -0.75.  The  estimate  of 
the  direct price elasticity is  considerably  smaller  than that  ~stimated 
by  Ames,  et ale  but  slightly larger  than  the  ones  used  by  Rojko,  et ale 
Total  wheat  production  (QWH)  is determined  by  regressing  wheat 
production  against  wheat  area,  the  lagged  deflated price of  wheat  a 18 
linear  time  trend  (Trend)  and  a  zero-one  dummy  variable  (D76)  to 
represent  the  drought  in 1976. 






+  6.00 AW 
(5.88) 
[1.60] 
+  15.27  SPWH(-1) 
(0.91) 
[0.40] 
+  1.62 Trend 
(3.28) 
D.W.  = 1.37 
4.61  D76 
(-2.13) 
Sample  = 1968/69 - 1982/83 
Equation  (3.6)  shows  that  there has  been  a  strong  trend  in  wheat 
production equalling  1.62 mmt/year  between  1968/69 and  1982/83.  This  is 
consistent with  the  growth  in average  wheat  yields which  have  increased 
from  less  than  2.5 mt/ha  in  the early 1960's  to over  4.5 mt/ha  by  the 
early 1980's.  The  variable representing  changes  in  the  price of  wheat 
relative  to  the cost  of  inputs  has  a  small  t-value but  the  authors  feel 
prices  have  played  a  role  in increasing yields. 
3.3.2  Demand  Block 
Wheat  is used  in  the  EC  both for  human  food  and  in  animal  feeds. 
The  total  domestic  disappearance  of  wheat  has  increased  from 
approximately  37  mmt  in the  early 1960's  to  50  mmt  by  the  mid-1980's. 
Nearly  all of this demand  growth  has  been  for  feed  wheat,  since  wheat 
for  food  purposes,  between  1960  and  1983,  has  only varied  from  a  high of 
31.2 mmt  in  1965  to  a  low  of  29.3  mmt  in 1982. 
Following  conventional demand  theory the per capita demand  for  food 
wheat  (DWHFO/POP)  is assumed  to  be  a  function  of  the real price of wheat 
and  real per capita consumption  expenditures  (PCDY).  Before  presenting 
the  estimated  equation  a  brief discussion of  the  price  variable  is 
necessary.  Even  though the  EC  has  recently been  a  net exporter  of wheat 
it  has  continued  to  import  high quality wheat,  from  the rest  of  the 
world,  to  blend  with its domestically grown  wheats  to  improve  their 
milling qualities.  The  share of  imported wheat,  as  a  fraction  of total 
food  use  (SREC)  has  declined  from  over  25  percent  in the  late 1960's  to 
slightly more  than  ten percent  by  the early 1980's.  The  price  paid  by 
millers  for wheat  (CPWH)  is a  blend  price equal  to  the  threshold  price 
for  imported  wheat  and  the  local  price  for  domestic  wheat. 
Consequently,  in order to use  a  realistic price  in  the EC's  food  demand 
equation  a  weighted  average  of  the  threshold  price  and  the  domestic 
price  is used,  where  the weights  are determined  by  the  share of  total 
food  wheat  use  represented  by  imported  wheat. 
(3.7)  DWHFO/POP  =  0.140 
t-value  (11.58) 
0.009  CPWH 
(-1.38) 
[-0.09] 
0.016  PCDY 
-2.81 
[-0.12] 19 
R2  = 0  51  .  D.W.  = 2.04  Sample  =  1968/69  - 1981/82 
The  results of estimating  the  food  demand  for  wheat  are  about  as 
expected  with  a  very  inelastic  (-0.09)  direct price elasticity  and  a 
negative,  but  small  (-0.12),  income  elasticity.  The  coefficient  of 
determination  for  the  equation  is  small  but  this  is  largely due  to  the 
small variations  in per capita wheat  use  over  the  sample  period. 
The  demand  for  feed  wheat  (DWHFE)  is derived  from  the  demand  for 
animal  products  and  is consequently  a  function  of  the  price  of  wheat 
deflated  by  the  price of  hogs  (WPHG),  the  price of barley deflated  by 
the price of  hogs  (BPHG),  real  income  (DY),  to represent  the growth  in 
the  demand  for  meat,  and  a  variable  to represent  the  denaturing  premium 
(DENAT)  paid  to  EC  feed  compounders.  The  premium  was  paid  to  lower  the 
effective  price of wheat,  thus making  it competitive with barley as  a 
feed  grain,  and  was  discontinued  in 1974.  In  theory  the  denaturing 
premium  should  be  incorporated  in the  feed  demand  equation  by  adjusting 
the  feed  wheat  price downward  by  the  amount  of  the  effective  subsidy. 
However,  the  data  required  to make  this adjustment,  i.e.  the  quantity of 
feed  wheat  on  which  the  denaturing  premium  was  paid  in  each  member 
country,  was  not available  and  consequently  the  premium  was  included  as 
a  separate variable. 
The  quantity of wheat  produced  in  the  Community  is also  included  in 
the  feed  wheat  demand  equation.  This  variable  is  justified  on  the 
grounds  that  the  intervention price mechanism  may  prevent  domestic 
prices  from  reflecting  the  true  supply  and  demand  situation  in  the 
Community.  For  example,  if both wheat  and  coarse grain production are 
surplus  to  local needs  prices are not  allowed  to reflect  the  relative 
scarcity  of  the  different  grains  because  of  intervention  buying. 
Consequently,  relative price  changes  are muted  and  more  wheat  may  be  fed 
during  large  production years  than would  be  indicated by relative price 
changes.  The  feed  wheat  demand  estimates are presented  in  equation 
(3.8). 
(3.8)  DWHFE  = 
t-value 
elasticity 
R2  = 0  82  . 
-12.72 
(-1.68) 
10.93  WPHP 
(-2.21) 
[-1.37] 
+  9.76  BPHP 
(1.93) 
[1.13] 
+  0.31  DENAT 
(6.66) 
[0.17] 
+  16.88 DY 
(3.76) 
[1.23] 
+  0.14  QWH 
(2.07) 
[0.52] 
D.W.  = 2.39  RHO  = -0.56  Sample  = 1968/69 - 1980/81 
Equation  (3.8)  shows,  as  expected,  that  the  demand  for  feed  wheat 
is  quite  price elastic,  compared with  food  wheat  demand,  having  an 
estimated  direct price elasticity of  -1.37  and  a  cross  price elasticity 
with  respect  to  the barley price of  1.13.  I~ also appears  that  the 
denaturing  premium  had  a  significant  impact  on  feed  wheat  demand,  since 20 
a  one  ECU/tonne  subsidy  led  to  a  0.31  mmt  increase  in  wheat  feeding. 
Similarly a  one  tonne  increase  in wheat  production  leads  to  a  0.14  tonne 
increase  in wheat  feeding. 
In equation  (3.7),  in order  to  calculate the price of  food  wheat, 
the  share of  imported  wheat  relative to the  food  use  of wheat  is needed. 
This  import  share  (SREC)  is specified  to  be  a  function  of  the  threshold 
price  relative  to  the  reference  price  (PTHREF).  In  earlier 
specifications  the  domestic  supply  of wheat  and  real  income  were 
included  in  equation  (3.9)  but neither entered with  a  large  t-value •. 
(3.9)  Ln(SREC)  =  0.87 
t-value  (7.94) 
4.35  Ln(PTHREF) 
(-8.11) 
R2  = 0.82  D.W.  = 1.82  Sample  = 1968/69 - 1983/84 
The  results presented  in equation  (3.9)  indicate  that wheat  imports 
have  been very  sens1t1ve  to  the ratio of  threshold  to reference  prices 
for  wheat,  with  an  estimated elasticity of -4.35  (Richardson).  Equation 
(3.9)  has  been  specified  as  being  linear in  the  logarithms  of  the 
variables  since  the  estimated  share  cannot  be  less  than  zero. 
The  Communities  total  imports  of wheat  (IMWH)  can  be  calculated by 
mUltiplying  the  estimated  import  share  by  the total  demand  for  food 
wheat,  as  in equation  (3.10). 
(3.10)  IMWH  =  DWHFO  * SREC 
In  order  to complete  the  demand  side of  the model  it is  necessary 
to  estimate  a  behavioral  equation  for  either wheat  inventory or  wheat 
exports,  since the other  component  can be  determined  as  the  residual  in 
the  supply-disposition  identity.  The  decision was  made  to  estimate 
wheat  stocks  directly and  let exports  be  the  residual  demand.  This 
appears  to  correspond with  EC  policy to  subsidize exports  rather  than 
build  intervention stocks. 
Wheat  stocks are held  in the  EC  both by  private stockholders  and  by 
the  public  in the  form of  inte~vention stocks,  which are  purchased  to 
support  the price of wheat at the  intervention  level. 
There  would  appear  to be  three main  factors  influencing  the  level 
of government  stocks.  First,  the  ending  inventory of wheat  is expected 
to  increase  with total  production.  Second,  government  inventories 
should  decline  as  local  farm  prices rise  relative  to  intervention 
prices,  and  intervention stocks are reduced  by  selling on  the  ,domestic 
market.  Third,  increases  in the world  price of wheat  relative to the 
intervention price reduces  the need  for  export  subsidies  and  inventories 
are  expected  to  decline as  intervention stocks  are  exported. 
Commercial  stocks of wheat  may  be  a  function of  the  same  factors 21 
that  influence  government  stocks,  but  the  possibility  of  price 
speculation,  given  the  EC's  grain  regime  would  appear  quite  limited.  In 
addition,  the  EC  has  some  power  to  effect  the  allocation  of  wheat 
between  commercial  and  government  inventories  through  the  use  of 
"intervention  B",  where  private stock holders  are paid  to hold  grain off 
the  market  (CAP  Monitor).  However,  it is expected  that  commercial 
stocks will be  negatively correlated with government  stocks. 
Stock  estimates  represent  the  EC6  until  1972/73  and  the  EC10 
thereafter.  In  order  to obtain reasonable  estimates  of the  equations 
over  the  1969/70 - 1982/83  time  period  the  production variable  (QWH)  for 
the  EC10  has  been adjusted  by  subtracting  a  quantity equal  to production 
in  the  four  new  member  countries  (DIWH)  between  1969/70  and  1972/73. 
The  coefficient  values  in  the  estimated  government  inventory 
equation  (3.11) all have  the  correct  signs  but  the  t-value  on  the world 
price/intervention price variable  is small.  However,  if the coefficient 
on  this variable  is  zero  then  the  Community's  exports  of  wheat  during 
the  crop  year  would  be  completely  inelastic,  given  the  structure of the 
rest  of  the model,  which  seems  unrealistic.  The  government  inventory 
equation  is  estimated  in  log-linear  form  so  as  to  avoid  generating 
negative  estimated values. 
(3.11)  Ln(GIWH)  =  - 14.89  0.20 Ln(IMPWH/PWHIN) 
(-0.43)  t-value  (-5.09) 
R2  = 0  80  . 
- 5.02  Ln(PINV) 
(-2.97) 
D.W.  = 2.55 
+  4.12  Ln(QWH-DIWH) 
(5.32) 
Sample  = 1969/70  - 1982/83 
No  price  responsiveness  could  be  identified  in  the  commercial 
inventory  (CIWH)  equation  (3.12)  but  a  strong  transactions  demand  and  an 
important negative relationship with government  stocks was  detected.  A 
dummy  variable  (D74)  was  included  to account  for  an  outlying observation 
in 1974/75. 
(3.12)  CIWH  =  -0.93 
t-value  (-0.71) 
elasticity 





+  0.15  (QWH+CIWH(-l)-DIWH) 
(4.76) 
[1.36] 
R2  = 0  75  .  D.W.  = 2.19  Sample  = 1969/70  - 1~S2/83 
The  demand  block of  the model  is completed with  the addition  of  two 
identities.  The  first  identity  (equation 3.13)  equates  total supply  and 
total demand. 22 
(3.13)  QWH  +  CIWH(-l)  +  GIWH(-l)  =  DWHFO  +  DWHFE  +  CIWH  +  GIWH 
+  DISCEC  +  NEXWH 
The  second  identity (equation 3.14)  defines net  exports  (NEXWH)  as 
the  difference  between  gross  exports  (EXWH)  and  gross  imports  (IMWH) , 
and  a  statistical  discrepancy variable  (DISCEX)  which  is  necessary 
because  gross  imports  and  gross  exports  are measured  on  a  July-June  crop 
year while  the net  export  figure,  calculated  from  equation  (3.13),  is 
based  on  a  August-July year. 
(3.14)  NEXWH  =  EXWH  IMWH  DISCEX 
3.3.3  Policy  Block 
Intervention  and  threshold prices  are  the key  instruments  used  in 
determining  wheat  (cereal)  policy  in  the  EC.  The  intervention  price 
sets  the  m1n1mum  internal  price  level and  the  threshold  price  the 
m1n1mum  import ,price  level.  In addition,  an  equation to  explain  the 
reference  price  for  wheat  is required  since it affects  the  share  of 
imported  food  wheat  in equation (3.9). 
The  EC  policy makers  objective function  1S  assumed  to  be  one  of 
maxim1z1ng  the  income  transfer  from  consumers  and  taxpayers  to 
producers,  subject  to both an  interY1' budget  constraint,  and  external 
and  internal political constraints.  Therefore,  five  factors  can  be 
identified as  influences  on  the setting of  intervention prices.  First, 
the  inflation  rate  in the  Community  is  important  in  determining  the 
nominal  price increases necessary to maintain  the real price of  cereals 
(Josling  and  Pearson).  Second,  revenues,  in the  form of variable  levy 
income,  are received  for  imported  cereals,  mainly wheat  and  c~rn,  and 
consequently serve to offset  the  budget  constraint.  Third,  revenue  is 
expended  on  export  subsidies  for  wheat  and  barley,  resulting  in 
increased  budgetary  pressures.  Fourth,  the cost of the  EC's  price 
support  system  for  commodities  other  than  wheat,  particularly  dairy 
products,  can have  an  effect on  the  cereals  sector by  reducing  the  funds 
available for  the  support of cereals.  Finally, variations  in the  "green 
rates"  of  exchange  can have  an  impact  on  the  setting  of  the  common 
intervention  price.  Ritson  has  argued  that green rate  devaluations, 
which  serve  to  increase cereal prices denoted  in  local currencies,  have 
in  the  past  removed  much  of  the  pressure  to  increase  the  common 
intervention price while  Tangermann  (p.  43)  states,  "the rates  by  which 
the  Council  of  Ministers  increases  support  prices  annually  are  not 
independent  of  developments  of  exchange rates." 
The  next  step  is to determinisyariables which  can  act as; proxies 
for  the  factors  considered  above.  The  task  is  complicated  by  the 
fact  that  there are only a  limited number  of  observations  available, 
since  common  intervention prices were  first  announced  in  1967/6S.  The 
variables  chosen  to  represent  the net  cost of the EC's  wheat  policy 
were:  (1)  the net  exports  of wheat  (NEXWH)  lagKed  two  years,  and  (2)  the 23 
ratio  of  last  year's  intervention price relative  to  last  year's  CIF 
import  price,  measured  in  ECU's,  PWHIN(-l)/IMPWH(-l).  As  net  wheat 
.exports  increase,  and  as  the  intervention price rises relative to  the 
import  price,  the  cost  of  export restitutions  increases  and  there  is 
both  internal  budget,  and  external political  pressure  to  moderate 
further  increases.  Variables  similar  to  those  constructed  for  wheat 
could  be  used  to  represent  the  feed  grain sector,  however,  in this  case 
it would  probably be  best  to use  the relationship of  the  threshold  price 
of  corn  to  the world  price of  corn as  a  proxy  for  the  levy  revenue 
earned  on  corn  imports.  Unfortunately,  attempts  to  incorporate 
variables  related  to  the  feed  grain sector  in the  equation  explaining 
the  intervention price for  wheat  were unsuccessful.  Invariably  these 
variables  entered  the  explanatory equation  with  low  t-values,  and 
consequently,  no  variables  related  to  the  feed  grain sector appear  in 
the  wheat  intervention price equation. 
A weighted  average of  the  consumer  price  indices  in the  EC  (CPI)  is 
used  as  the measure  of  inflation  in  the  Community.  The  postulated 
relationship  between  inflation and  the  intervention price  is positive. 
A  weighted  average  of green rates  of  exchange  (EXRGR)  is used  to 
reflect  the  impact  that  changes  in  the  green rates may  have  had  on  the 
intervention price.  An  increase  in  the  index of green rates represents 
a  devaluation of member  countries  currencies relative to  the  ECU.  Thus, 
~ncreases _  in  .the  l~~dex  of  green  rates  should  result  in  lower 
~nterventlon pr1ces. 
No  measure  of general  EC  budget  pressure,  or proxies  for  the  cost 
of  the  CAP  for  other commodities,  are  included  in  the  estimated 
equation.  This  decision was  taken  to  conserve  degrees  of  freedom  and  to 
maintain  the  partial equilibrium nature of  the model.  It is,  however, 
an  area worthy of further attention. 
Equation  (3.15)  illustrates the results of estimating  the  function 
to  explain  the  intervention price of wheat. 
(3.15)  PWHIN  = 
t-value 
elasticity 
R2  = 0  99  . 
154.4 - 87.2  EXRGR  +  1~28 CPI(-l)  - 1.28 NEXWH(-2) 
(8.17)  (-3.91)  -(17.06)  (-2.74) 
[-0.71]  [0.64]  [-0.02] 
- 8.91  PWHIN(-l)/IMPWH(-l) 
(-3.06) 
[-0.10] 
D.W.  = 2.61  Sample  = 1968/69  - 1982/83 
All  of  the  coefficients  have  the  expected  signs  and  in general  the 
t-values  are  large.  The  elasticity with respect  to  the  worfd  wheat 
price  variable  is  quite  interesting because it implies  a  one  percent 
change  in  the ratio of  intervention to world  market  price  this  year 
leads  to  a  0.10 percent  change,  in  the  oppo~ite  direction,  1n  the 
intervention  price next  year.  While  the elasticity is  small  it  does 24 
substantiate  a  link between world  market  prices  and  price  changes  within 
the  Community.  It  is  also clear that  changes  in  green  rates  have 
influenced  the  intervention price with  an  estimated elasticity of  -0.71. 
Similarly,  increasing  wheat  exports  have  put  downward  pressure  on  the 
intervention price. 
The  other policy variable of  importance  in the wheat  sector  is  the 
threshold  price.  Theoretically,  both  the  threshold  and  intervention 
prices  are related  by  "market  elements"  to  the target price,  the  price 
in  the  most  deficit grain producing  region  in Germany.  However,  th~re 
appears  to be  considerable political discretion  in  setting the value  of 
the  "market  elements".  The  economic  impact  of  increases  in  the 
threshold  price is  to  reduce  the  competitiveness of third country grains 
in  the  EC.  Over  time  the  gap  between  intervention and  threshold  prices 
has  widened  considerably,  from  5.4  ECU  in 1967/68 to  66.3  ECU  1n 
1982/83. 
As  stated  in the  CAP  Monitor  the  threshold  price  decision  will 
depend  largely on  the  intervention price, 
"through  the  setting of  the  target price,  but  the  ministers 
can  nevertheless use  their powers  to  set the  target  price  so 
as  to  increase  or decrease  the  competitiveness  of  third 
country  grain on  the  Community  market.  Since  the  threshold 
price  is directly linked to  the  target price  the ministers  can 
change  the  relative competitive positions of  EEC  and  third 
country grains  by  changing  the  target prices  by  more,  or  less, 
than  the  intervention prices.  This  can  be  done  by  adjusting 
the  "market  element" at  Ormes,  which  is  the  only  arbitrary 
element  in  the  link between  the  intervention,  target  and 
threshold  prices  for  grain.  The  other  elements  of  the 
calculation  (transport  costs,  trading  margins,  etc.)  are 
either known  from  the  trade or measured  by  surveys.  In recent 
years  there  has  been  a  tendency  for  threshold  prices  to  rise 
by  more  than  intervention prices.  This  has  helped  to  price 
third  country grain out of  the  EEC  market  and  increase  the use 
of domestic  grain,  thus  curbing  support  buying  and  subsidized 
exports." 
Following  from this  the  threshold  price equation has  been specified 
to  be  consistent with an objective of minimizing  the  budgetary costs of 
the  EC's  wheat  policy.  As  such the  threshold price is specified to be  a 
function  of  (1)  the CIF  import  price of wheat;  (2)  net exports of wheat; 
and,  (3)  the  intervention price of wheat.  In  addition,  two  other 
variables are  included  in  the  equation,  a  lagged  dependent variable  to 
represent  the  influence of past" decisions  and  adjustment  constraints; 
and,  a  dummy  variable  to account  for  the  introduction  of  the  silo 
system. 





+  17.23  D7682 
(5.47) 
+  0.027  IMPWH(-l) 
0.15) 
[0.02) 
; R2  =  0  99  . 




+  0.63  NEXWH(-l) 
(2.83) 
[0.01] 
+  0.32  PWHTH(-l) 
(4.46) 
D.W.  = 1.84  Sample  = 1968/69 - 1982/83 
Equation  (3.16)  shows  that  a  one  ECU  increase  in  the  intervention 
price  results  in a  0.92  ECU  (this value  is not  significantly  different 
from  one)  increase  in the  threshold  price.  The  t-statistic on  the world 
price  variable  is only slightly larger  than  one  and  the  coefficient 
estimate  indicates  world  price  changes  have  only a  weak  influence  on 
threshold  prices.  The  impact  of  increasing net  exports  has  been  to 
increase  the  threshold price but  again,  the  short-run  impact  of  this 
variable,  while  statistically significant  is not  large.  The  long-run 
impacts  calculated  from  equation  (3.16)  will be  about  1.5 times  larger 
than  the  short-run  impacts. 
The  reference price for wheat,  which was  introduced  in 1976/77,  is 
between  the  threshold  and  intervention prices.  It is specified as  a 
function  of  the  threshold  and  intervention price with the  coefficients 
on  the  two  prices  constrained  to  sum  to one.  In  this  way  it  is 
guaranteed  that if both  the  threshold  and  intervention prices  increase 
by  one  ECU,  the reference price will also  increase by  one  ECU.  The 
equation estimate  is given  below. 
(3.17)  PWHRE  =  16.62 
t-value  (19.72) 
+  0.958  PWHIN 
(61.9) 
+  (1  - 0.958)  PWHTH 
(constrained) 
R2  = 0.99  D.W.  = 1.15  Sample  = 1976/77  - 1983/84 
In  order  to  conduct meaningful  simulations of  the  EC  wheat  model 
the  farm,  intervention  and  threshold  prices  for  barley  must  be 
endogenized.  The  farm barley price  is the key variable since it is  an 
important  determinant  of both wheat  area  and  wheat  feeding.  As  stated 
previously  the barley and  common  wheat  intervention prices have  been  the 
same  since  the  introduction  of  the  silo  system  in  1976/77. 
Consequently,  the  intervention price for barley  (PBAIN)  is  calculated 
using  an  identity  with an  exogenous  variable  (DISCBA)  equal  to  the 
difference  between  the  two  series prior to  1976/77  (equation 3.18). 
(3.18)  PBAIN  =  PWHIN  +  DISCBA 
The  threshold prices  for  barley and  wheat  are not  equal,  but  they 
have  tended  to move  together.  Consequently,  the barley thresho.1d  price 
(PBATH)  is  linked  to  the wheat  threshold price  (PWHTH)  in  'equation 
(3.19). 0.19)  PBATH  =  -1.77 
t-value  (-1.29) 
elasticity 
26 
+  0.92  (PWHTH) 
(96.34) 
[1.01] 
R2  = 0.99  D.W.  = 1.59  RHO  = 0.31  Sample  = 1968/69  to  1983/84 
Two  other variables  of policy interest are  the  cost of  EC  export 
subsidies  and  the  levy revenue  obtained  from  wheat  exports  and  imports, 
respectively.  Since  the values  for  these variables are not  reported ,it 
is  only possible  to  provide approximations.  Export  subsidies  (ECSUB) 
are  calculated  by  mUltiplying  the  difference  between  the  EC's 
intervention  price  and  the  U.S.  export  price  (measured  in  ECU's)  by 
gross  exports  (equation 3.20). 
o .20)  ECSUB  =  (PWHIN  EXPWH  * EXCHRECU)  * EXWH 
Import  levy  (LEVYINC)  income  is approximated  as  the  difference 
between,  the  threshold price plus  the  average  intra-year price  1ncrease 
(THADJ)  and  the  EC's  import  price  for wheat  multiplied  by  gross  imports 
(equation 3.21). 
0.21)  LEVYINC  =  (PWHTH  +  THADJ  IMPWH)  *  IMWH 
In  the  simulations  presented  in section 4  the net  revenue 
from  the  EC's  wheat  policy is  reported.  It is  calculated 
3.22)  as  the  difference  between  levy  income  and  export 
converted  to U.S.  dollars. 
(3.22)  NETREV  =  {LEVYINC  ECSUB)/EXCHRECU 




The  farm  prices  of wheat  and  barley  in  the  individual  member 
countries  of  the  EC  are normally  between  the  intervention price and  the 
threshold  price.  Farm prices can,  however,  fall slightly below  the 
intervention price because  of marketing  charges  and  taxes  levied against 
farmers,  and  subtracted  from  the  intervention price.  The  level  of 
domestic  farm  prices  and  their reaction  to  changes  in  the  level  of 
intervention  prices  is  of crucial  importance  because'  these  are  the 
prices which enter  individual countries  supply and  demand  functions. 
Prior  to  1976/77  it seemed  clear that  a  one  unit  change; in  the 
intervention price, measured  in the  countries  own  currency, would  result 
in  close  to  a  one unit  change  in  the  countries  domestic  price  level, 
assuming  the  margin  between  the  intervention  and  threshold  prices 
remained  constant.  However,  with  the widening  of  the  gap  between 
threshold  and  intervention prices  it is  less  obvious  that  changes  in the 27 
intervention  price  will  lead  to  changes  in  the  domestic  price  of  an 
equal magnitude,  unless  the  farm price  is very  close  to  the  intervention 
price.  To  put  it another way,  there  is considerably more  latitude for 
local  supply  and  demand  conditions  to  influence  the  local price  level, 
now,  than  when  the difference between  intervention and  threshold prices 
were  much  smaller.  In  examining  the data,  however,  only  in 1976/77  when 
the  EC's  production  of  feed  grains fell 12.5 percent·  from  the  year 
earlier  level is  there  strong  evidence  of upward  pressure  on  domestic 
wheat  and  barley prices  caused  by  local supply  and  demand  conditions, 
and  even  in  this  case it is not  consistent across all countries. 
In  order  to model  the relationship between  the  EC's  original  six 
member  countries  farm prices,  for  wheat  and  barley,  and  the  common 
intervention  prices  a  set  of  four variables  were  included  1n  the 
specification  of  each  equation.  First,  the  intervention  price 
multiplied  by  the  individual countries  green rate.  The  coefficient  for 
this  variable  determines  the  degree  of price  transmission  from  the 
intervention  price  to  the  farm price.  As  argued  by  Coleman  the 
coefficient  is  expected  to  be  less  than one.  Second,  a  dummy  variable 
(D7682)  equal  to  zero prior to  1976/77  and  one  thereafter is  included  to 
account  for  the  introduction of  the silo system  and  reference  price 
mechanism.  Third,  the ratio of  EC  wheat  and/or  feed  grain production  to 
EC  domestic  wheat  and/or  feed  grain consumption  is used  to reflect  the 
general  supply  and  demand  condition within  the  Community.  A  negative 
relationship  between  the  farm price and  this measure  of excess  supply is 
expected.  Fourth,  the difference between  the  threshold  and  intervention 
price measures  the  degree  of protection from  third country  imports.  As 
the  threshold  price  rises relative to  the  intervention  price  third 
country  imports  are discouraged  and  this  should  serve  to  increase  the 
domestic  farm price.  The  results of  these  regressions  for  both  wheat 




FPWH.NE  = 
t-value 
elasticity 
R2  = 0.98 
FPBA.NE  = 
t-value 
elasticity 
R2  = 0.95 
46.66 
(1.49) 
+  0.88  (PWHIN  * EXRGR.NE) 
(10.51) 
[0.84] 
+  37.27  D7682 
(5.22) 
+  24.99 D76 
(2.60) 
D.W.  = 2.16  Sample  =  1968/69  - 1982/83 
3.64  +  1.01  (PBAIN  * EXRGR.NE)  +  53.60 D7682 
(0.13)  (13.99)  (3.30) 
[0.98] 
r 
D.W.  =  1.60  Sample  = 1968/69 - 1982/83 28 
France: 
(3.25)  FPWH.FR  =  5.89  +  0.87  (PWHIN  *  EXRGR.FR)  +  105.02 D7682 
t-value  (0.20)  (11.90)  (4.20) 
elasticity  [0.91) 
2  R  = 0.99  D.W.  = 1.61  RHO  = 0.42  Sample  = 1968/69-1982/83 
0.26  )  FPBA.FR  =  53.36  +  0.84  (PBAIN  *  EXRGR.FR)  +  82.9  D76 
t-value  (1.25)  (13.1 )  (1.97) 
elasticity  [0.91) 
R2  = 0.94  D.W.  = 1.68  Sample  = 1968/69  - 1981/82 
Germany: 
0.27)  FPWH.WG  =  99.19  +  0.79  (PWHIN  *  EXRGR.WG) 
t-value  (1.53 )  (4.75) 
elasticity  [0.71) 
+  56.74 D7682  +  43.09 D76 
(5.73 )  (2.76) 
R2  = 0.94  D.W.  = 1.37  Sample  = 1968/69  - 1982/83 
0.28)  FPBA.WG  =  88.30  +  0.87  (PBAIN  *  EXRGR.WG)  +  57.60  D76 
t-value  (2.22)  (8.49)  0.30) 
elasticity  [0.78) 
R2  = 0.88  D.W.  = 1.50  Sample  = 1968/69 - 1982/83 
Italy: 
0.29)  FPWH.IT  =  8260.6  +  0.99  (PWHTH)*EXRGR.IT 
t-value  0.74)  (34.90) 
[0.94) 
R2  = 0.99  D.W.  = 1.35  Sample  = 1968/69 - 1982/83 
(3.30)  FPBA.IT  =  11222.7  +  0.90  (PBATH)*EXRGR.IT 
t-value  (3.36)  (41.14) 
elasticity  [0.91) 
R2  z::  0.99  D.W.  = 1.34  Sample  = 1968/69 - 1982/83 Belgium-Lux: 
(3.31) 
(3.32) 
FPWR.BE  = 
t-value 
elasticity 








+  1.01  (PWRIN  * EXRGR.BE) 
(15.94) 
+  940.1  D7682 
(9.52) 
[0.95] 
D.W.  = 1.71  Sample  1968/69 - 1982/83 
87.71 
(0.21) 
+  0.98  (PBAIN  * EXRGR.aE) 
(13.5) 
+  714.7  D76 
(2.51) 
[0.97] 
D.W.  = 1.67  Sample  = 1968/69  - 1982/83 
Several  general  comments  with respect  to  the  estimated price  link 
equations  can be made.  First,  in no  case  was  it possible to  identify 
the  influence of  EC  supply  and  demand  conditions  on  local  farm  prices. 
A dummy  variable  (D76)  for  1976/77  was  included  in most  of  the  equations 
to  account  for  the  one  year  in which  a  supply shortfall clearly  raised 
farm  prices.  Second,  the  introduction  of  the silo  system  (D7682) 
clearly  raised  the  farm price of wheat  relative  to  the  intervention 
price  in all countries  except  Italy.  In Italy,  which  is  a  deficit grain 
producing  area  farm  prices are  close  to  the  threshold  prices,  and 
consequently  the  farm  price has  been  linked  to  the  threshold  price 
instead  of  the  intervention price.  Third,  changes  in the margin  between 
threshold  and  intervention  prices  had  no  statistically  significant 
impact  on  farm prices  in any  of  the  countries.  Fourth,  most  of  the 
coefficients  of price transmission were  within  two  standard  deviations 
of 1.0,  the  exceptions  being  for  barley in France  and  Italy. 
Estimation  of the price  linkage equations  for  the three countries, 
(United  Kingdom,  Denmark,  Ireland)  entering  the  EC  in  1973  presents 
severe  difficulties because  of the  limited  degrees  of  freedom available 
to  estimate  the relationship.  In addition,  for  each country five  years 
elapsed before  they were  fully integrated within the  CAP.  During  this 
transition  period  intervention prices  for  the  three new  countries  were 
adjusted  downwards  by  an  accessionery  compensatory  amount  (ACA). 
Consequently,  in the  price  link equations  the ACA,  expressed  in ECU's, 
are  subtracted  from  the  intervention price before being  multiplied  by 
the  green  rate.  However,  other  than this  adjustment  these price  link 
equations  are specified  in a  manner  consistent with  those  for  the  other 
members  of  the  Community. 
Initial estimates  of the price coefficient  for  wheat  in the  United 
Kingdom  of  0.67  seemed  unreasonably  low.  Consequently,  this coefficient 
was  constrained  to  equal  0.90  in the  empirical  estimates  presented 
below.  A  similar  problem  occurred  in Ireland but  in this  case  the 
coefficient  in  the wheat  price equation was  unrealistically high at  1.43 
and  the  coefficient  for barley too  low at 0.67.  Therefore  the  wheat 
price  coefficient  was  constrained  to  equal  1.0  and  the  barley 
coefficient  0.90.  Again  in  the wheat  price  ~quation for  Denmark  the 
coefficient was  constrained  to  equal  0.90.  While  these constraints are 30 
somewhat  arbitrary they are consistent with  the  coefficients  estimated 
for  the other  six member  countries using much  longer  data  series.  The 
estimated  price  equations  for  the  United Kingdom,  Denmark  and  Ireland 
are  presented  below. 













+  0.90  (PWHIN  - ACA.UK)*EXRGR.UK 
(constrained) 
[0.81] 
+  5.70  D7682 
0.65) 
R2  = 0.95  D.W.  = 2.07  Sample  = 1973/74 - 1982/83 
FPBA.UK  =  20.34  +  0.78  (PBAIN  - ACABA.UK)*EXRGR.UK  +  6.66  D76 
t-value  (5.89)  07.95)  0.95) 
e last  ic ity  [0.73] 
R2  = 0.98  D.W.  = 2.32  Sample  = 1973/74 - 1982/83 
FPWH.DE  =  80.14  +  0.90  (PWHIN  - ACAWH.UK)*EXRGR.DE 
t-value  (6.56)  (constrained) 
elasticity  [0.86] 
+  0.25  (PWHTH  - PWHIN)  *  EXRGR.DE 
(6.74) 
[0.06] 
R2  = 0.99  D.W.  = 1.45  Sample  = 1973/74 - 1982/83 
FPBA.DE  +  0.93  (PBAIN  - ACABA.DE)*EXRGR.DE  +  116.60  D76  =  72.10 
0.69)  t-value 
elasticity 
(23.52)  (3.63) 
[0.92] 
R2  = 0.99  D.W.  = 1.01  Sample  = 1973/74 - 1982/83 
FPWH.ID  =  225.90  +  1.0  (PWHIN  - ACAWH.ID)*EXRGR.ID 
(3.82)  (constrained)  t-value 
elasticity  [ 1.04] 
R2  = 0.97 
- 3.06  Trend 
(-3.84) 
+  11.66 D7682 
(2.33)  .. 
D.W.  c  2.99  Sample  = 1973/74 - 1982/83 (3.38)  FPBA.ID  =  150.3 
(5.53)  t-value 
elasticity 
31 
+  0.9  (PBAIN  - ACABA.ID)  EXRGR.ID  - 1.93  Trend 
(constrained)  (-5.50) 
[0.99] 
R2  = 0.98  D.W.  = 1.88  Sample  = 1973/74 - 1982/83 
The  specifications  of,  and  results  for  these  equations  are 
consistent  with  those  estimated earlier,  with  the  exception of a  linear 
trend  variable  included  in both equations  for  Ireland.  This  variable 
captures  a  downward  trend  in  the  farm  price relative to  the  intervention 
price over  the  sample  period. 
3.3.5  Identities 
The  individual member  countries  intervention and  threshold  prices 
for  wheat  and  barley are aggregated  into a  set  of  index numbers,  using  a 
series  of  identities,  which  are  then  used  in  the  aggregate  EC 
relationships  as  discussed  in section 3.2. 
Equation  (3.39)  is used  to calculate the  supply price 
equation  (3.40)  the  supply price of barley and  equation 
consumption  price of wheat. 
of  wheat, 





























An  index  of  farm  prices  divided  by  intervention  prices  using 
production  (equation 3.42)  weights  is needed  for  the  inventory  equation 
and  an  index  of  threshold  prices divided  by  reference  prices  using 
consum~ofon  weights  is  used  in the  import  share  equation  (equation 
3.43).  Similarly an  index of wheat  and  barley prices divided  by  hog 
prices  (equations 3.44 and  3.45)  is needed  in  the  feed  demand  equation. 
(3.42)  PINV  =  O.0206*(FPWHL.BE/(PWH.ECIN*EXRGR.BE»+O.4378*(FPWHL.FR/ 
(PWH.ECIN*EXRGR.FR»+O.1881*(FPWHL.IT/(PWH.ECIN*EXRGR. 




















3.3.6  Rest  of  the  World 
There  are at  least  three options with regard  to  the way  the rest of 
the world  could  be  incorporated  into  the model.  First, the world  price 
could  be  assumed  exogenous.  However,  the  impact  of  EC  policy changes  on 
the world  wheat  price  is of primary  interest.  Second,  the  EC  model  could 
be  combined  with a  disaggregated world  wheat  model  but  this  requires 
further  research.  A  third option is used  in this  study,  whereby  a 
synthetic  excess  demand  function with a  price elasticity consistent with 
the  EC's  trade  share  and  assumed  rest of  world  supply  and  demand 
elasticities is used  to  close  the model  (Appendix  II).  The  intercept of 
the  excess  demand  function  is  then  chosen  so  that  the world  price  will 
equal  its  actual value if the  EC's  net  exports  are  estimated  without 
error.  The  elasticity  of  excess  demand  facing  the  Community  was 
calculated  to  equal  -19.9  when  evaluated  at  average  pr~ees  and 
quantities  for  the  1978-1982  time  period.  To  incorporate  this 
elasticity in the model  the  following  two  equations  are  added, 
(3.46)  ED ROW  =  IROW  - 1.14 EXPWB  ,  and 33 
(3.47)  EDROW  =  NEXWH, 
where  EDROW  is  the  excess  demand  facing  the  EC.  The  value of -1.14 was 
calculated  to  impose  an elasticity of -19.9 and  lROW  was  calculated.  to 
satisfy the  identity.  Equation  (3.47)  closes  the model  by  equating  excess 
demand  and  excess  supply. 
The  model  solves  for  the  export  price of No.1,  soft red  winter 
wheat,  at  the  U.S.  Gulf ports.  However,  the  EC  policy equations  are 
based  on  the  communities  ClF  import  price of wheat.  Consequently,  the 
EC  import  price  (in ECU's)  is  linked  to  the  U.S.  export price  (in  U.S. 
dollars)  through  an  identity with  the margin  (MMlMP)  between  the  two 
price  series considered  exogenous  (3.48). 
(3.48)  lMPWH/ EXCHRECU  =  EXPWH  +  MMlMP 34 
Model  Validation  and  Multipliers 
4.1  Model  Validation 
It is well  known  that  individual equations  which  appear  satisfac-
tory when  estimated  individually may  exhibit undesirable properties when 
combined  in  a  dynamic  simulation model.  The  purpose,  of this  section, 
is  to  examine  the  ability  of  the  model  to  track  the  historical 
observations  from which  the  equations  were  estimated. 
The  model  was  validated over  the  period  1976  through  1981,  the 
longest«  period  for  which  actual  values  of  all  of  the  endogenous 
variables  were  available.  Table  4.1  contains  the  following  descriptive 
statistics:  (1)  mean  of the actual values;  (2)  mean  of  the  simulated 
values;  (3)  mean  error;  (4)  mean  o~ thZ1yercentage  errors;  and,  (5)  root 
mean  square  percentage error  (RMSPE).  It is clear that most  of  the 
endogenous  variables  validate  very well with  26  of  the  34  variables 
presented  having  RMSPEs  of  less  than  five percent.  All of  the variables 
with  large  RMSPEs  are based  on  either wheat  imports,  wheat  exports  or 
both.  Consequently,  some  discussion of  the validation performance  of 
these variables  is  in order. 
Exports  of wheat  are  the residual  item  in  the  Community's  supply-
demand  identity  and  therefore  contain  all of  the  errors  made  in 
predicting  the other quantity variables.  Exports  are underpredicted,  on 
average,  by  0.60 mmt  over  the  simulation period.  Most  of  this error was 
caused  by  the  small  mean  errors  in production  (-0.24)  and  imports 
(-0.17).  In general,  the model  tracked  the  level of exports  quite well 
with  the  largest error  (both in actual and  percentage  terms)  occurring 
in  1976  when  actual exports  were  5.1  mmt  and  the  estimated figure  3.4 
mmt.  The  largest error  (1.05 mmt)  in predicting  imports  occurred  ~n 
1979.  The  average  percentage error  over  the  last three years was 
(-11.9),  but  i~ volume  terms  this error represented only 0.59 mmt/year. 
Net  export"s  and  net  revenue  have  large mean  percentage and  RMSPEs 
because  some  of  the actual observations  are close  to  zero,  which results 
in  large percentage errors,  even when  the absolute error is  relatively 
small. 
In general,  the model  seems  to  track the  endogenous  variables  quite 
well.  In  section 4.2 several multipliers  for  the model  are  presented 
which  illustrate the reaction of  the model  to  exogenous  shocks. 
4.2  Multipliers  ; 
In  tables  4.2 to  4.5  impact,  average  and  eighth year  cumulative 
multipliers  are presented  for  selected variables.  Since  the model  is 
nonlinear  the multipliers are not  unique,  and  depend  on  the size of  the 
change  in  the  exogenous  variable and  the starting values used  for  the Table  4.1  Dynamic  Validation  Statistics,  1976  to  1981 
Hean  of 
Actual  Values 





Mean  of 
Percentage 
Errors 





Endogenous  Variables! 
Area  12.04 mil.  haG  11. 93  -0.11  -0.8  2.5 
Production  48.37  mmt  48.13  -0.24  -0.5  4.1 
Feed  Demand  11.88 mmt  11.87  -0.02  0.1  4.1 
Food  Demand  30.81  mmt  30.75  -0.05  -0.2  0.6 
Exports  9.92  mmt  9.32  -0.60  -5.9  17 .6 
Imports  4.83  mInt  4.66  -0.17  -2.8  13.5 
Net  Export s  5.66  mmt  5.23  -0.43  89.8  316.4 
Inventory  (Commercial  & Government)  7.76  mmt  7.80  0.04  0.7  11.8 
EC  Wheat  Supply  Price  106.33  percent  106.23  -0.09  0.1  2.0 
EC  Barley  Supply  Price  108.70  percent  108.71  *  0.1  2.8 
Wheat  Intervention  Price  149.37  ECU/mt  150.32  0.95  0.6  1.8 
Wheat  Threshold  Price  197.45  ECU/mt  198.84  1.39  0.7  1.4 
Wheat  Import  Price  119.40  ECU/mt  119.76  0.36  0.3  1.1 
Wheat  Export  Price  137.33  dol/mt  137.71  0.38  0.3  1.1 
Wheat  Export  Refunds  307.45  mi 1.  ECU  305.06  -2.38  -5.0  22 .1 
Wheat  Levy  Revenue  427.44 mil.  ECU  419.63  -7.80  -1.7  13 .0 
Net  Revenue  146 .67  mil.  dol.  137.17  -9.48  -43.3  113.6 
Farm  Wheat  Price,  Belgium  6978.3  francs  7011. 5  33.2  0.4  1.8 
Farm  Wheat  Price.  Denmark  1162.2 kroner  1164.5  2.3  0.1  2.7 
Farm  Wheat  Price,  France  822.3  francs  833.4  11.1  1.1  2.2 
Farm  Wheat  Price.  Ireland  92.9  pounds  93.5  0.6  0.8  2.9 
Farm  Wheat  Price.  Italy  217617.0  lire  213455.0  -4161.1  -2.2  4.2 
Farm  Wheat  Price.  Netherlands  460.0  guilders  462.3  2.3  0.5  1.5 
Farm  Wheat  Price.  United  Kingdom  90.8  pounds  90.6  -0.2  -0.6  3.B 
Farm  Wheat  Price,  West  Germany  498.2  marks  495.8  -2.4  -0.5  1.6 
w 
U1 Table  4.1  Continued 
Hean  of 
Actual  Values 





t1ean  of 
Percentage 
Errors 





Farm  Barley Price,  Belgium  6223.3  francs  6296.4  73 .1  1.1  2.5 
Farm  Barley Price,  Denmark  1105.3  kroner  1123.4  18.1  1.7  2.6 
Farm  Barley  Price,  France  748.1  francs  753.2  5.1  0.5  2.9 
Farm  Barley Price,  Ireland  86.2  pounds  85.5  -0.6  -0.8  4.2 
Farm  Barley  Price,  Italy  182333.0  lire  182038.0  -295.3  -0.5  4.1 
Farm  Barley  Price,  Netherlands  4114.2  gui lders  445.8  1.6  0.3  1.7 
Farm  Barley  Price,  United  Kingdom  85.2  pounds  85.2  *  -0.2  2.9 
Farm  Barley Price,  West  Germany  468.7  marks  465.8  -3.0  -0.6  2.7 
---- *  less  than  0.05. 
w 
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endogenous  variables  (Pindyck  and  Rubinfeld,  1981,  p.  393). 
To  calculate  the multipliers,  the model  was  sim~l?ted over  the  1976 
to  1983  time  period  to create  a  base  simulation.  The  exogenous 
variable  was  then  changed,  by  a  constant  amount  for  the  years  1976  to 
1983,  and  the  model  resimulated.  The  difference between  the  base 
simulation and  the new  simulation  shows  the effect of  the  change  in  the 
exogenous  variable  on all of the  endogenous  variables  (Labys).  The 
change  in  the  endogenous  variables,  in the first  time  period,  is called 
the  impact  multiplier.  In  each  time  period  thereafter  a  cumulative 
multiplier  can  be  calculated.  In the  tables  the multiplier  for  the 
eighth  year  is presented.  In addition,  an  average multiplier is also 
presented  which  gives  the  average  change  in  the  endogenous  variables 
over  the  eight  year  simulation period. 
4.2.1  Excess  Demand  Multiplier 
The  multipliers  in table  4.2  show  the reaction of  the  Community  to 
a  sustained decline of  10  mmt  in their excess  demand  curve.  This  was 
accomplished  by  subtracting 10  from  the  intercept  (IROW)  in  equation 
3.46.  This  could  correspond  to persistent  production  increases-in  the 
rest of  the world,  or  as  a  result of policy actions  which  decreased  the 
domestic  demand  for  wheat  outside  the  Community. 
As  shown  in table  4.2  the decline  in  excess  demand  lowers  the world 
price  by  $8.77/mt  in  the first  time  period  (the decline  in  price  is 
nearly  constant  over  the entire simulation).  This price  change  has 
almost  no  effect on  the quantity variables  in  the  EC.  The  average 
decline  in net  exports  is  only 0.06 mmt  and  0.03  in the eighth  period. 
Intervention and  threshold prices are  likewise effected only marginally, 
falling  by  less  than  0.5 percent  by  the  eighth year  of  the  simulation. 
The  only  variables reflecting  large  changes  are those related  to 
trade policy.  Wheat  export  subsidies  are up  substantially (23.8 percent 
on  average)  and  while  levy  income  is also up  (7.9 percent  on  average) 
the  net  cost of  the  EC's  wheat  policy  increases  by  76.9 million dollars 
(81.1  percent)  by  the  eighth year  of  the  simulation. 
In  summary, 
domestic  prices, 
subsidies. 
world  price changes  are reflected only marginally  in 
and  exports  are  maintained  by  increasing  export 
4.2.2  ECU/U.S.  Dollar Exchange  Rate Multiplier 
Table  4.3  gives  the  multipliers  for  a  0.10  decrease  in  the 
ECU/do11ar  exchange  rate.  This  represents  a  devaluation of  the  U.S. 
dollar  or  a  revaluation of  the  ECU.  Again  quantity  varia~les  and 
domestic  prices  change  little in the face  of a  revaluation of  the  ECU, 
although as  expected net  exports  do  decline slightly (1.5 percent  by  the 
eighth year). 
The  Community's  import  price,  measured  in  ECU's,  declines  by  9.2 Endogenous  Variables: 
Production 
Feed  Demand 
Food  Demand 
Exports 
Imports 
Net  Exports 
Wheat  Supply  Price 
Barley  Supply  Price 
Wheat  Intervention  Price 
Wheat  Threshold  Price 
Wheat  Import  Price 
Wheat  Export  Price 
Wheat  Export  Refunds 
Wheat  Levy  Revenue 
Net  Revenue 
Figure  4;2  Hultipliers  (or  a  10  mmt  Decrease  in  the  Excess 
Demand  Facing  the  EC 
Hultipliers 
l3a se  Va lue  Impact  Average 
Unit  Percent  Unit  Percent 
49.84  mrnt  0.0  0.0  -0.08  -0.2 
12.35  mmt  0.0  0.0  *  * 
30.80  mmt  0.0  0.0  0.01  * 
10.41  nunt  *  -0.1  -0.06  -0.6 
4.51  mmt  0.0  0.0  0.02  0.5 
6.33  mmt  *  -0.1  -0.06  -0.6 
104.16  percent  0.0  0.0  -0.35  -0.3 
106.50  percent  0.0  0.0  -0.38  -0.3 
158.49  ECU/mt  0.0  0.0  -0.57  -0.4 
211.48  ECU/mt  0.0  0.0  -1.05  -0.5 
131.15  ECU/mt  -7.75  -8.4  -7.89  -6.0 
137.24 dol/mt  -8.77  -7.9  -8.70  -6.3 
322.34 mil.  ECU  25.79  19.1  76.84  23.8 
413.34 mil.  ECU  41.11  8.3  32.86  7.9 
106.46 mil.  dol  17.73  4.3  -45.19  -42.4 
---------.----------
Eighth  Year 
Cumulative 
Unit  Percent 
-0.04  -0.1 
*  * 
0.01  * 
-0.04  -0.3 
0.03  0.7 
-0.04  -0.3 
-0.25  -0.3 
-0.27  -0.3 
-0.50  -0.3 
-1.09  -0.4 
-10.40  -5.7 
-8.72  -6.1 
131.89  55.2 
40.03  11.4 
-76.94  -81.08 
*  less  than  0.005  for  unit  values  and  less  than  0.05  for  percentage  values. 
w 
00 Endogenous  Variables: 
Production 
Feed  Demand 
Food  Demand 
Exports 
Imports 
Net  Exports 
Wheat  Supply  Price 
Barley  Supply  Price 
Table  4.3  Multipliers  for  a  0.10  Decrease  in  the 
ECU/U.S.  Dollar  Exchange  Rate 
Hultipliers 
Base  Value  Impact  Average 
Unit  Percent  Unit  Percent 
49.84 mmt  0.0  0.0  -0.12  -0.2 
12.35  mmt  0.0  0.0  *  * 
30.80 mmt  0.0  0.0  0.01  * 
10.41  mmt  *  -0.1  -0.09  -0.9 
4.51  mmt  0.0  0.0  0.04  0.8 
6.45  mmt  *  -0.3  -0.13  -2.0 
104.16  percent  0.0  0.0  -0.56  -0.5 
106.50  percent  0.0  0.0  -0.60  -0.6 
Wheat  Intervention  Price  158.49  ECU/mt  0.0  0.0  -0.93  -0.6 
Wheat  Threshold  Price  211.48  ECU/mt  0.0  0.0  -1.68  -0.8 
Wheat  Import  Price  131.15  ECU/mt  -9.16  -10.0  -13 .02  -9.9 
Wheat  Export  Price  137.25 do1/mt  *  *  0.11  0.1 
Wheat  Export  Refunds  322.34 mil.  ECU  32.44  23.9  123.31  38.2 
Wheat  Levy  Revenue  413 .34 mil.  ECU  48.58  9.9  53.69  13 .0 
Net  Revenue  106.46  mil.  dol.  65.23  16.1  -68.72  -64.5 
Eighth Year 
Cumulative 
Unit  Percent 
-0.12  -0.2 
*  * 
0.01  * 
-0.10  -0.7 
0.05  1.2 
-0.15  -1.5 
-0.42  -0.4 
-0.44  -0.4 
-0.82  -0.4 
-1.88  -0.8 
-17.97  -9.9 
0.13  0.1 
211.51  88.6 
69.91  13.9 
-121.24  -127.76 
------- -------------
*  less  than  0.05. 
w 
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ECU's/mt  initially,  because  of  the  revaluation of  the  ECU,  while  export 
prices  measured  in dollars rise marginally.  The  big  changes  are  again 
reflected  in  the variables related  to  trade policy. 
The  devaluation of  the  ECU  causes  the  Community's  export  subsidies 
(measured  in  ECU)  to  increase,  because  the world  market  price  (measured 
in  ECU)  is now  lower  than it was  previously,  and  to  increase  by  even 
more  when  measured  in dollars.  While  levy  income  is up,  for  reasons 
opposite  to those given  above,  the net  cost  of  a  0.10  devaluation of  the 
dollar  with  respect  to  the  ECU  is 121.24  million  dollars,  a  127..8 
percent  change,  by  the  eighth year. 
It  is  interesting to note  that  between  1979/80  and  1983/84 the  U.S. 
dollar  has  revalued  by  0.47  ECU/do11ar,  or 65.2 percent.  Using  the 
multipliers  presented  above  it is clear this has  saved  the  EC  many 
millions  of  dollars  in budget  costs.  If the  value  of  the  dollar 
declines  in  the  future,  as  many  believe  it  must,  it  will  put 
considerable additional  pressure  on  the  Community's  budget. 
4.2.3  Multipliers  for  Intervention Price  Shock 
One  of  the purposes  of calculating multipliers  is to  see  if  the 
model  responds  to  external shocks  in ways  consistent  with  a  priori 
beliefs.  In  this  spirit  the  intercept  in  the  intervention  price 
equation  is  shocked  by  adding  10  ECU  to it.  Table  4.4 illustrates  the 
results  of  this test.  The  intervention price  increase  (7.3  percent  in 
the  first  period)  feeds  through to  a  farm wheat  price  increase  of  5.6 
percent  1n  the  first  time  period  and  a  5.5 percent'  increase  1n  the 
barley  farm  price.  Wheat  production  expands,  but  the  expansion  is 
modest,  averaging  two  percent.  Food  and  feed  demand  change  only 
slightly  and  exports  increase by  9.9  percent,  on  average.  Imports 
increase initially,  but  given  time  for  the  threshold  price to adjust  to 
the  higher  intervention price,  by  the eighth year  imports  are  down  by 
0.10 mmt  or 2.5 percent. 
Export  refunds  jump 
in  the  base  simulation. 
the  cost  of subsidies 
92.61 million dollars. 
substantially,  averaging  41.8 percent  more  than 
Import  levy  income  also goes  up,  but  on  average 
is greater than  the  increase  in  levy  income  by 
Although  a  constant  10  ECU  is  added  to  the  intervention  price 
equation,  in each  time  period,  feedback  through  the net  export  and  the 
lagged  intervention  price in the equation results  in  an  intervention 
price  only  7.41  ECU  greater than  the base  in the  eighth year  of  the 
simulation.  In contrast,  the  impact multiplier for  the threshold  price 
is  9.2  ECU/mt  and  rises to  11.41  ECU/mt  by  the eighth year. 
In general,  all of the multipliers have  the  expected  signs· and  the 
magnitudes  of  the values  seem  reasonable.  The  small production response 
may  be  somewhat  surprising but  the  small value  follows  directly from  the 
fact  that  wheat  and  barley intervention,  and  hence  farm  prices  are 
linked  together because  of  the silo system. Endogenous  Variables: 
Production 
Feed  Demand 
Food  Demand 
Exports 
Imports 
Net  Exports 
Wheat  Supply  Price 
Barley  Supply  Price 
Table  4.4  Multipliers  for  a  10  ECU  Increase  in  tile  Intercept 
of  the  Intervention  Price  Equation 
Hultipliers 
Base  Value  Impact  Average 
Unit  Percent  Unit  Percent 
49.84 mmt  0.0  0.0  1.01  2.0 
12.35  mmt  -0.13  -1.2  0.02  0.1 
30.80  mmt  -0.15  -0.5  -0.11  -0.4 
10.41  mmt  0.60  17.9  1.03  9.9 
4.51  mmt  0.34  6.4  -0.05  -1.0 
6.45  mmt  0.26  18.5  1.07  16.6 
104.16  percent  6.25  5.6  4.82  4.6 
106.50  percent  6.68  5.5  5.14  4.8 
Wheat  Intervention  Price  158.49  ECU/mt  10.00  7.3  8.41  5.3 
Wheat  Threahold  Price  211.48  ECU/mt  9.20  5.2  11.53  5.5 
Wheat  Import  Price  131.15  ECU/mt  -O.iO  -0.2  -0.87  -0.7 
Wheat  Export  Refunds  322.34 mil.  ECU  64.62  47.7  134.74  41.8 
Wheat  Levy  Revenue- 413.34 mi 1.  ECU  84.77  17.2  50.90  12.3 
Net  Revenue  106.46  mil.  dol  22.86  5.6  -92 .61  -87.0 
_._---_._---- --------.----..-.---. 
*  less  than  0.005. 
Eighth Year 
Cumulative 
Unit  Percpnt 
1.07  1.9 
0.03  0.2 
-0.08  -0.3 
1.07  7.9 
-0.10  -2.5 
1.17  11.3 
3.39  3.6 
3.61  3.7 
7.41  4.0 
11.41  4.5 
-1.22  -0.7 
1/.4.16  60.4 
40.64  11.5 
-86.70  -91.4 
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4.2.4  Multipliers  for  Threshold  Price  Shock 
The  threshold  price  is  shocked  by  adding  10  Eeu's  to the  intercept 
of  the  threshold  price equation  (table 4.5).  As  expected  the  increase 
1n  the  threshold  price  lowers  imports  by  22.2  percent  on  average. 
Domestic  farm  prices  for  wheat  increase by  0.9 percent  in  the  first 
period  and  only slightly more  on  average.  Domestic  demand  contracts 
slightly and  gross  exports decline,  but  not  by  as  much  as  gross  imports, 
so net  exports  increase.  The  small  increase  in net  exports  causes  world 
prices  to  decline very slightly. 
Both  levy  income  and  export  refunds  decline resulting  1n  a  net 
budget  cost  of  17.6 million dollars  on  average. 
; Table  4.5  Multipliers  for  a  10  ECU  Increase  in  the  Intercept 
of  the  Threshold  Price  Equation 
Multipliers 
Base  Va lue  Impact  Average  Eighth Year 
Cumulative 
Unit  Percent  Unit  Percent  Unit  Percent 
Endogenous  Variables: 
Production  49.84 mmt  0.00  0.0  0.24  0.5  0.28  0.5 
Feed  Demand  12.35 mmt  -0.04  -0.4  -0.03  -0.2  -0.02  -0.2 
Food  Demand  30.80  mmt  -0.04  -0.1  -0.03  -0.1  -0.02  -0.1 
Exports  10.41  mrnt  -0.95  -28.2  -0.70  -6.7  -0.46  -3.4 
Imports  4.51  mrnt  -1.04  -19.6  -1.00  -22.2  -0.80  -20.0 
Net  Exports  6.45  mmt  0.09  6.7  0.30  4.6  0.34  3.3 
~ 
w 
Wheat  Supply  Price  104.16  percent  0.99  0.9  1.06  1.0  0.75  0.8 
Barley  Supply  Price  106.50  percent  1.01  0.8  1.07  1.0  0.75  0.8 
Wheat  Intervention  Price  158.49  ECU/mt  0.00  0.0  -0.27  -0.2  -0.55  -0.3 
Wheat  Threshold  Price  211.48  ECU/mt  10.00  5.7  13.72  6.5  14.33  5.6 
Wheat  Import  Price  131.15  ECU/mt  -0.07  -0.1  -0.24  -0.2  -0.20  -0.2 
Wheat  Export  Refunds  322.34 mil.  ECU  -38.07  -28.1  -27.5  -8.5  -10.71  -4.5 
Wheat  Levy  Revenue  413 .34 mil.  ECU  -53.80  -10.9  -43.03  -10.4  -23.21  -6.6 
Net  Revenue  106.46  mil.  do 1  -17.79  -4.4  -17.57  -16.5  -10.47  -11.04 
*  les~  than  0.05. 44 
Conclusions 
This  study has  focused  on  the  cereal sector of  the  EC.  This  focus 
is  justified because  of the  EC's  tremendous  growth  in cereal  production 
over  the  past  15  years,  which  has  resulted  1n  their  becoming,  in 
1984/85,  the world's  second  largest  exporter of wheat  and  a  net  exporter 
of  coarse  grain.  These  gains  in production  and  exports  have  b~en 
achieved  by  providing  EC  cereal  producers with  prices which are normally 
well  above  world  market  levels.  As  a  result  cereals  can  only  be 
exported  through  the use  of  export  subsidies,  and  imports  are restricted 
through  the use  of variable  import  levies.  The  continued  and  increasing 
use  of export  subsidies  by  the  EC  has  been viewed,  particularly by  the 
United  States,  as  an unfair trade practice.  On  several occasions  the 
U.S.  has  threatened  to match  the  EC's  subsidies with export  subsidies  of 
their  own.  It is this threat  of  a  trade war  between  the  U.S.  and  EC 
which  has  the  greatest  potential for  damaging  the  Canadian  grain 
producer.  Consequently,  it is  important  for  Canada  to understand  the 
cereal policies of  the  EC,  and  the  economic  forces  which  have  shaped  and 
influenced  their policy formulation.  In addition,  it is  important  to 
understand,  and  to  have  quantitative measures  of,  the  effects  of 
alternative policy options which may  be  implemented  in  the  future. 
As  a  first  step  towards  meeting  the  above  objectives  the  key 
elements  of  the  EC  cereal policy have  been outlined.  This  information 
is  then  used  to specify and  estimate an  econometric model  of  the  EC 
wheat  market.  The  model  was  then validated  and  a  series of multipliers 
calculated  to  show  how  the  Community's  wheat  sector  responds  to 
exogenous  shocks.  This  analysis highlights  several  fundamental  features 
of  Community  policy. 
First,  while  the Community  does  adjust  their 
in response  to world  price changes,  the response, 
short-run is very small.·  Thus,  world  price  changes 
Community  primarily through  changes  in the  cost of 
in  levy  income. 
internal price  level 
particularly in  the 
are reflected  in the 
export  subsidies  and 
Second,  the strength of the U.S.  dollar relative to  the  ~CU, since 
1980,  has  resulted  in  large  budget  savings  for  the  EC.  In  fact,  in 
1984/85,  with  the Community  facing  the  largest exportable  surplus  of 
cereals  in their history,  the  strength of  the U.S.  dollar has  reduced 
export  subsidies  to  insignificant  levels. 
Third,  common  cereal  prices  have  not  prevailed  across  the 
Community's  member  countries  since  1969.  The  so-called "common"  price 
level  is converted  to domestic  currencies using  green rates of  exchange 
which  differ  from  market  rates  of  exchange.  Consequently~  member 
countries  farm  prices  depend  as  much  on  changes  in their green rates  as 
on  changes  in the announced  intervention price.  Changes  in green rates, 
in turn,  influence  the  setting of  the  announced  intervention price. 
Finally,  changes  in intervention prices  for  wheat  have  only  a  small 45 
impact  on  the  area  planted  to wheat  since  common  wheat  and  coarse grain 
intervention  prices  have  been  linked  together  through  the operation  of 
the  "silo" price system. 
In  summary,  it appears  that  the model  developed  in this  paper will 
be  a  useful  tool  in evaluating  a  range  of policy options  which may  be 
pursued  by  the  EC.  Some  of  these alternatives which will be  addressed 
in  future  papers  are:  production  controls,  domestic  price supports  but 
no  export  subsidies,  and  the  elimination of green rates  of  exchange. 
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Footnotes 
1/  Buckwell  et ale  provides  a  recent  assessment  of  the welfare effects 
of  the  common  agricultural policy. 
2/  Barichello  et  ale 
relations. 
provides  a  recent  reV1ew  of  US/EC  trade 
3/  Paraphrased  from  reprints of  Secretary Block's  speeches. 
4/  Paraphrased  from  remarks  given  by  Senator  Quayle  at  the  U.S. 
Department  of Agriculture's  outlook conference,  December,  1984. 
5/  The  guarantee  threshold requires  intervention and  reference  prices 
for  cereals  to be  cut  if grain production  exceeds  a  predetermined 
quantity  (Toepfer).  Tangermann  (p.  48)  argues  however  that  "the 
form of  the provisions  appears  to  indicate  that  for  the  time  being 
they  (guarantee  thresholds)  are merely  paying  lip-service to  the 
need  of market  adjustment." 
6/  Josling  and  Pearson  have  examined  the  EC's  budgetary problem  from  a 
macroeconomic  framework;  and,  one  of  the  purposes  of this research 
is  to  examine  some  of  the  proposals  for  the  cereal sector  in a  more 
comprehensive  fashion. 
7/  The  model  is  developed  to analyze  the aggregate  effects  of  EC 
policy  changes  and  provides  little or  no  information  on  the 
distribution  of  costs or benefits between member  countries  1n  the 
EC. 
8/  A fifth price,  the  target price  (259.08  ecu  in 1984/85)  represents 
the  price the Commission  would  like to prevail in  Duisburg,  West 
Germany,  the most  deficit area  in the  Community.  The  target  price 
is,  at  least  in theory,  the price  from  which  the threshold  and 
intervention  prices  are derived.  This  is based  on  the  cost  of 
shipping grain  from  import  positions  to Duisburg,  for  the  threshold 
price;  and,  from  Ormes,  France  (the main  grain surplus area)  to 
Duisburg  for  the  intervention price.  In fact,  political factors 
are  important  in determining  both the  threshold  and  intervention 
prices.  Consequently,  the  target price,  and  the margins  between 
the  target  and  the  threshold  and  intervention prices  are  simply 
adjusted  to  accommodate  the desired price  levels. 
9/  Monetary variables  in the  EC  were  denoted  in units of account  (UA) 
until  1978/79,  following  which  the numeraire  currency was  changed 
to  the  European  currency unit  (ECU).  All monetary  vari~les  in 
this  study have  been  converted  from UA's  to  ECU's  using  the  annual 
exchange  rates  reported  by  Eurostat  (1981). 
10/  Prior 
wheat 
to  1976  there were  regional  interve~tion prices  for 
(Harris,  Swinbank  and  Wilkinson,  pp.  67-68). 
common 
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complication  is not  introduced  in  the  econometric  model  where  farm 
prices  are related to  a  common  intervention price. 
11/  Harris,  Swinbank  and  Wilkinson  (pp.  77-7S)  describe  the method  used 
by  the  Commission  to set  the  level of refunds. 
12/  The  theory of variable  import  levies  has  been  discussed  by  Sampson 
and  Snape. 
13/  Harris,  Swinbank 
and  complications 
levy. 
and  Wilkinson  (pp.  73-76)  outline  some  prob1~ms 
which arise  in  the  course  of  calculating  the 
14/  Harris,  Swinbank  and  Wilkinson;  Fennel,  and  the  Cap  Monitor  provide 
some  of  the history and  a  description of  the  system  of  monetary 
compensatory amounts.  Ritson  and  Tangermann;  Harvey;  Schmitz;  and 
Langworthy,  Pearson  and  Josling  provide  econom1C  analyses  of 
various  aspects  of the  MCA  system. 
The  calculation  of  MCA's  involves  a  number  of  complex 
operational details,  special rates  and  special circumstances.  For 
details  see  the  Cap  Monitor. 
15/  See  the references  given  in footnote  14  for analysis of  the  redis-
tributiona1 effects of MCA's. 
16/  Given  the  limited  degrees  of  freedom available  to  estimate 
inventory  equation,  it  was  decided  to  estimate this  equation 
ordinary  least  squares. 
the 
by 
17/  The  formulation  is  consistent  with  the  arguments  of  Bale  and 
Koester,  and  Tangermann. 
IS/  Koester  (p.  19-21)  argues  that  "there is no  method  for  making 
reasonable  predictions of  EC  grain prices."  However,  much  of his 
argument  rests  on  the difficulty of predicting  green  rates  and 
other  national  policies  which  influence  individual  member 
countries.  Bale  and  Koester  specify pricing objectives consistent 
with  the  specification used  for  intervention prices  in this paper. 
19/  The  weights  attached  to  the member  countries  green rates  should  be 
proportional to the countries  influence  in determining  intervention 
prices  for  cereals.  Since  these  weights  are  unknown  wheat 
production  shares are used  as  a  proxy. 
20/  Prior  to  1976/77  when  the reference price  was  introduced,  the 
reference price was  assumed  to  equal  the  intervention  price.  For 
the  three new  member  countries  intervention prices were  assumed  to 
equal  farm  prices prior to entry.  ; 
21/  Some  of  the  endogenous  variables,  primarily price variables  using 
different  weighting  schemes.  are  omitted  from  table  4.1  No 
important  information  is  lost or  hidden.by not  reporting  these 
variables. 48 
22/  Data  for  most  of  the  exogenous  variables  were  available  through 
1982/83  and  for  Some  through  1983/84.  Missing  values  were 
estimated  using  trend  projections  and  pre liminary  estimates 
contained  in Green  Europe. 
; 49 
References 
Ames,  G.  C.  W.,  and  ten Haff,  C.  J.  1979.  Analysis  of  Domestic  Grain 
Supply  in  the  European  Community,  1960-1974.  Res.  Bul.  235,  Exp. 
Stat., Uni.  of Georgia. 
Anderson,  K.,  and  Tyers,  R.  1983.  European  Community's  Grain  and  Meat 
Policies  and  U.S.  Retaliation:  Effects  ~  International Prices, 
Trade  and  Welfare.  Dept.  of  Economics,  Australian  National 
University. 
Bale,  M.  D.  and  Koester,  U.  1983.  "Maginot  Line  of  European  Farm 
Policies."  The  World  Economy  6(4):373-91. 
Barichello,  R.  R.,  Josling,  T.,.  Petit, 
US/EC  Agricultural Trade  Relations: 
Paper  presented  to  the  International 
Consortium,  Asilomar,  California. 
M.,  and  Tangermann,  S.  1984. 
Issues  and  Policy  Options. 
Agricultural Trade  Research 
Bredahl,  M.  E.,  Meyers,  W.  H.  and  Collins,  K.  J.  1979.  "The  Elasticity 
of  Foreign  Demand  for  U.S.  Agricultural Products:  The  Importance  of 
the Price Transmission Elasticity."  Amer.  .J..:..  Agr.  Econ.  610):58-
63. 
Buckwell,  A.  E.,  Harvey,  D.  R.,  Thomson,  K.  J., and  Parton,  K.  A.  1982. 
The  Costs  of  the  Common  Agricultural Policy.  London:  Croom  Helm. 
C.A.P.  Monitor  1984.  Published  by  AgraEurope.  London. 
Colman,  D.  1984.  Imperfect  Transmission  of  Policy Prices.  Unpublished 
paper,  Dept.  of Agr.  Econ.,  University of Manchester. 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities.  1984.  The  Agricultural 
Situation  in the  Community:  1983  Report.  Brussels. 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities.  1984.  Agricultural Markets. 
Various  issues,  Brussels. 
Cronin,  M.  R.  1979.  "Export  Demand  Elasticities with Less  Than  Perfect 
Markets."  Aust.  .J..:..Agr.  Econ.  23(1):69-72. 
de  Gorter,  H. 
Economy. 
1983.  Agricultural  Policies:  !  Study  in  Political 
Ph.D.  thesis,  University of California,  Berkeley. 
Eurostat  1981.  Yearbook  of  Agricultural  Statistics  1976-1979. 
Statistical Office of  the  European  Communities. 
Eurostat  1983.  Yearbook  of  Agricultural  Statistics  1978-1981. 
Statistical Office of  the  European  Communities. 
Fair,  R.  C.  1976.  !  Model  of  Macroeconomic  ~ctivity Volume  II:  The 50 
Empirical  Model.  Cambridge:  Ballinger Pub.  Co. 
Fennell,  R.  1979.  The  Common  Agricultural  Policy of  the  European 
Community.  London:  Granada  Pub. 
Food  and  Agricultural 
Production Yearbook. 
Organization 
Rome,  Italy. 
of  the  United  Nation  1983. 
Green  Europe.  1984.  European  Community  Commission  Proposes Agricultural 
Prices  for  1984/85.  Published  by  the  Agricultural  Information 
Service  of  the  Directorate  General  for  Information,  European 
Community  Commission,  Brussels. 
Harris,  S. , 
Po lic  ies 
Sons. 
Swinbank,  A.,  and  Wilkinson,  G.  1983.  The  Food  and  Farm 
of  the  European  Community.  Chichester:  John  Wiley  and 
Harvey,  D.  R.  1982. 
7 (3) : 174-90. 
"National  Interests  and  the  CAP."  Food  Policy 
Herlihy,  M.,  Magiera,  S.,  Hasha,  G.,  and  Kelch,  D.  1983. 
Oilseeds,  and  Livestock:  Selected Statistics,  1960-80. 
703,  Econ.  Res.  Ser.,  U.S.  Dept.  of Agriculture. 
Home  Grown  Cereals Authority.  Cereal Statistics.  London. 
EC  Grains, 
Stat.  Bul. 
International Monetary  Fund  1984.  International Financial  Statistics. 
Washington,  D.C.,  monthly. 
Josling,  T.  E.,  and  Pearson,  S.  R.  1982.  Developments  in  the  Common 
Agricultural  Policy of  the  European  Community.  For.  Agr.  Econ. 
Rpt.  172,  Econ.  Res.  Ser.,  U.S.  Dept.  of Agriculture. 
Koester,  U.  1982.  Policy Options  for  the Grain  Economy  of  the  European 
Community:  Implications  for  Developing  Countries.  Res.  Rpt.  35, 
Inter.  Food  Policy Res.  Inst., Washington,  D.C. 
Langworthy,  M.,  Pearsqn,  S.,  and  Josling,  T.  1981.  "Macroeconomic 
the  European  Influences  on  the  Future Agricultural  Prices  1n 
Community."  Eur.  Rev.  of Agr.  Econ.  8(1):5-26. 
Labys,  W.  C.  1973. 
and  Simulation. 
Dynamic  Commodity  Models:  Specification,  Estimation 
Lexington,  Mass.:  D.C.  Heath  and  Company. 
Meilke,  K.  D.,  and  Griffith,  G.  R.  1983.  "Incorporating  Policy 
Variables  in an  Econometric  Model  of the  World  Soybean/Rapeseed  and 
Products Market."  Amer.  ~  Agr.  Econ.  650):65-73. 
Paarlberg,  P. 
Community 
Ag.  Econ. 
L.,  and  Sharples,  J.  A.  1984.  Japanese  and  European 
Agricultural Trade  Policies:  Some  u.S.  Strategies.  For. 
Rpt.  204,  Econ.  Res.  Service,  u.S.  Dept.  of Agrioulture. 
Pindyck,  R.  S.,  and  Rubinfeld,  D.  L.  1981.  Econometric  Models  and 
Economic  Forecasts.  New  York:  McGraw-Hill. 
.. 51 
Rayner,  A.  J.,  and  Reed,  G.  V.  1984.  ~ Comparative  Statics Model  of 
Policy  Interaction ££ the  World  Grain  Market.  Discussion  paper  40, 
Dept.  of  Economics,  University of  Nottingham. 
Richardson,  J.  D.  1973.  "Beyond  (but 
Substitution  in International Trade." 
back  to?)  the Elasticity  of 
Eur.  Econ.  Rev.  4(4):381-92. 
Ritson,  C.  1982.  Forecasting  EEC  Support  Prices."  Discussion  Paper  DP 
2,  Dept.  of Agr.  Marketing,  University of  Newcastle  Upon  Tyne. 
Ritson,  D.,  and  Tangermann,  S.  1979.  "The  Economics  and  Politics 'of 
Monetary  Compensatory Amounts."  Eur.  Rev.  of Agr. ~  6(2):119-
164. 
Rojko,  A.,  Fuchs,  H.,  O'Brien,  P.,  and 
Futures  for  World  Food  in  1985. 
Structure  and  Equations,  For.  Ag. 
Statistics  and  Cooperatives  Service, 
Regier,  D.  1978.  Alternative 
Volume  3,  World  GOL  Model 
Econ.  Rpt.  151,  Economics, 
U.S.  Dept.  of Agriculture. 
Sampson,  G.  P.,  and  Snape,  R.  'H.  1980.  "Effects of  the  EEC's  Variable 
Import  Levies."  h  Pol.  Econ.  88(5):1026-1040. 
Sarris,  A.  H.,  and  Freebairn.  J.  1983.  "Endogenous  Price Policies  and 
International Wheat  Prices."  Amer.  h  Agr.  Econ.  65(2):214-24. 
Schmitz,  P.  M.  1979.  "EC  Price  Harmonization:  A  Macroeconomic 
Approach."  Eur.  Rev.  of ~  Econ.  6(2):165-190. 
Tangermann,  S.  1983.  "What  is Different  about  European Agricultural 
Protectionism?"  The  World  Economy  6(1):39-58. 
Toepfer  International. 
1984/85.  Hamburg. 
1984.  The  E.E.C.  Grain  Market  Regulation 
U.S.  Dept.  of Agriculture.  1980.  Unpublished  data obtained  from  the 
International Economics  Division,  Economic  Research Service. 
U.S.  Dept.  of Agriculture.  1984a.  Foreign Agriculture Circular:  Grains. 
Foreign Agricultural Service,  various  issues. 
U.S.  Dept.  of Agriculture,  1984b.  Wheat  Situation.  Economic  Research 
Service,  various  issues. 
.. 52 
Appendix  I 
Mnemonics  and  Variable Definitions 
Endogenous  Variables 
AWH  EC-10  wheat  area,  million hectares  (U.S.D.A.,  1984a;  Herlihy, 
et a1.). 
BPHP  A  weighted  average  of  EC-9  member  countries  producer  prices 
for  wheat  divided  by  their producer  prices  for  hogs,  using 







Commercial  inventories  of wheat,  end  of  crop  year,  EC-6  until 
1972-73,  EC-10  thereafter,  mmt.  Calculated  by  subtracting 
government  inventories  from  total  inventory  (Home  Grown 
Cereals Authority;  U.S.D.A.,  1984a). 
A weighted  average  of  EC-9  member  countries  producer  price  and 
threshold  price  indices  for  wheat  deflated by  their  consumer 
price  indices,  using  wheat  consumption  shares  as  weights  (see 
equation 3.41),  crop  year,  1980=1.00. 
Quantity of wheat  used  for  feed  1n  the  EC-10,  crop year,  mmt 
(U.S.D.A.,  1984a;  Herlihy et a1.). 
Quantity of wheat  used, for:  food  1n  the  EC-10,  crop year,  mmt 
(U.S.D.A.,  1984a;  Herlihy et al.). 
A  proxy  for  the  cost  of export  subsidies  for  wheat,  EC-10, 
crop year,  million  ECU.  Calculated as  the difference between 
the  intervention price and  the U.S.  export  price  for  wheat 
(converted  to  ECU's),  times  the  EC-10's  gross  exports  of 
wheat. 
Exess  demand  facing  the  EC-10,  crop  year,  mmt.  Calculated  to 
equal  NEXWH. 
EXPWH  U.S.  export price for  No.1  soft red winter wheat,  Gulf  ports, 
June-May,  do1lars/mt  (U.S.D.A.,  1984b). 
EXWH  EC-10  wheat  exports '(excluding  intra-EC  trade), July-June,  mmt 
(U.S.D.A.,  1984a;  Herlihy et a1.). 
~PBAL.BE  Producer price of barley,  Belgium/Lux.,  crop  year,  francs/mt 
(Herlihy  et  al.;  Commission  of  the  European  Communities, 
1984). 
FPBAL.DE  Producer 
(Herlihy 
1984). 
price  of 
et  a!.; 
barley,  Denmark, 
Commission  of  the 
crop  year,  kroner/mt 
European  CommUnities, 
FPBAL.FR  Producer  price  of  barley,  France,  crop  year,  francs/mt 
.' FPBAL.ID 
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price  of 
et  al.; 
barley,  Ireland, 
Commission  of  the 
crop  year,  pounds/mt 
European  Communities, 
FPBAL.IT  Producer  price of barley,  Italy,  crop  year,  lire/mt  (Herlihy 
et al.;  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  1984). 
FPBAL.NE  Producer  price of barley,  Netherlands,  crop  year,  guilders/mt 
(Herlihy  et  al.;  Commission  of  the  European  Communities, 
1984) • 
FPBAL.UK  Producer  price of barley,  United  Kingdom,  crop  year,  pounds/mt 
(Herlihy  et  al.;  Commission  of  the  European  Communities, 
1984). 
FPBAL.WG  Producer  price of barley,  West  Germany,  crop  year,  marks/mt 
(Herlihy  et  al.;  Commission  of  the  European  Communities, 
.1984). 
FPWHL.BE  Producer  price  of  common  wheat,  Belgium/Lux.,  crop  year, 
francs/mt  (Herlihy  et  al.;  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities,  1984). 
FPWHL.DE  Producer  price of  common  wheat,  Denmark,  crop  year,  kroner/mt 
(Herlihy et ali  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  1984). 
FPWHL.FR  Producer  price of  common  wheat, 
(Herlihy  et  al.;  Commission 
1984). 
France,  crop  year,  francs/mt 
of  the  European  Communities" 
FPWHL.ID  Producer  price of  common  wheat,  Ireland,  crop  year,  pounds/mt 
(Herlihy  et  al.;  Commission  of  the  European  Communities, 
1984). 
FPWHL.IT  Producer 
(Herlihy 
1984). 
price of  common  wheat,  Italy,  crop  year,  lire/mt 
et  al.;  Commission  of the  European  Communities, 
FPWHL.NE  Producer  price  of  common  wheat,  Netherlands,  crop  year, 
guilders/mt  (Herlihy  et  al.;  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities,  1984). 
FPWHL.UK  Producer  price of  common  wheat,  United  Kingdom,  crop  year, 
pounds/mt  (Herlihy  et  al.;  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities,  1984). 
FPWHL.WG  Producer  price  of  common  wheat,  West  Germany,  crop  year, 
marks/mt  (Herlihy  et  al.;  Commission  of  the  'European 
Communities,  1984). 














1972-73,  EC-10  thereafter,  mmt  (Home  Grown  Cereals Authority; 
U.S.D.A.,  1984a). 
EC,  C.LF. 
(Commissio~ 
Karkets).a 
import  price for  common  wheat,  crop  year,  ECU/mt 
of  the  European  Communities,  Agricultural 
EC-10  wheat  imports  (excluding  intra-EC trade),  July-June,  mmt 
(Herlihy et al;  U.S.D.A.,  1984a). 
A  proxy  for  the  income  earned  from variable  levies  on  wheat, 
EC-IO,  crop year,  million ECU.  Calculated  as  the  differe~ce 
between  the  annual  average  threshold price  (PWHTH+THADJ)  minus 
the  EC's  import  price for  wheat,  times  the  quantity of  wheat 
imported. 
Levy  income  from  wheat  less  export  subsidies  for  wheat 
converted  to  U.S.  dollars,  crop  year, million dollars. 
Net  exports  of wheat,  crop  year,  mmt,  1966  to  1973  for  the 
EC-6  and  for  the  EC-IO  thereafter  (U.S.D.A.,  1984a). 
EC-IO  wheat  production,  mmt  (U.S.D.A.,  1984a;  Herlihy et al.). 
Intervention price for  barley,  crop year,  ECU/mt  (Herlihy et 
al.;  CAP  Monitor).a 
Threshold  pric7 for barley,  crop  year,  ECU/mt  (aerlihy et al.; 
CAP  Monitor).  a  . 
A  weighted  average of  EC-9  member  countries producer 
for  wheat  divided  by  their  intervention  prices  for 
using  wheat  production  shares  as  weights  (see  equation 




A  weighted  average of  EC-9  member  countries  threshold  prices 
plus  the coefficient of  equivalence divided  by  their reference 
price,  using wheat  consumption  shares  as  weights  (see  equation 
3.43),  crop year.  NOTE:  The  threshold  and  reference  prices 
for  wheat  in the United  Kingdom,  Denmark  and  Ireland prior to 
1973  was  assumed  to equal  their domestic  producer price. 
Intervention price  for  wheat,  crop  year,  ECU/mt  (Herlihy  et 
al.;  CAP  Monitor).a 
Reference  price for  minimum  quality bread mtking wheat,  crop 
year,  ECU/mt,  (Herlihy et al.;  Toepfer).a  NOTE:  Prior  to 
1976/77,  when  the  reference  price  was  introduced,  the 
reference price  is assumed  to  equal  the  intervention price. 
Threshold  pric7 for wheat,  crop  year,  ECU/mt  (Herlih~ et al.; 
CAP  Monitor).a 55 
SREC  EC-10  wheat  imports  divided  by  domestic  food  use,  crop  year, 




A  weighted  average  of  EC-9  member  countries 
indices  for  barley  deflated  by  the  cost 
requisites,  using  wheat  production  shares  as 
equation 3.40),  crop  year,  1980=1.00. 
producer  price 
of  production 
weights  (see 
A  weighted  average  of  EC-9  member  countries  producer  price 
indices  for  wheat  deflated  by  the  cost  of  production 
requisites,  using  wheat  production  shares  as  weights  (see 
equation 3.39),  crop  year,  1980=1~00. 
A weighted  average  of  EC-9  member  cuntries producer  prices  for 
wheat  divided  by  their producer  prices  for  hogs,  using  wheat 
production shares  as  weights  (see  equation 3.44),  crop  year. 
Exogenous  Variables 
ACAWH.DE  Accessionary  compensatoryamgynt  for  wheat,  Denmark,  crop 
year,  ECU/mt  (U.S.D.A.  1980). 
ACAWH.ID  Accessionary  compensatory  am?unt  for  wheat,  Ireland,  crop 
year,  ECU/mt  (U.S.D.A.  1980).a 
ACAWH.UK  Accessionary  compensatory  amount  f?r wheat,  United  Kingdom, 
crop  year,  ECU/mt  (U.S.D.A.  1980).a 
ACABA.DE  Accessionary  compensatory amgynt  for  barley,  Denmark,  crop 
year,  ECU/mt  (U.S.D.A.  1980). 
ACABA.ID  Accessionary  compensatory amoynt  for  barley,  Ireland,  crop 
year,  ECU/mt  (U.S.D.A.  1980).a 
ACABA.UK  Accessionary  compensatory amount  foy  barley,  United  Kingdom, 
crop year,  ECU/mt  (U.S.D.A.  1980).a 
CEQUIV  Coefficient  of  equivalence  for  14  percent  protein  spring 
wheat,  crop year,  ECU/mt  (CAP  Monitor). 
CPI  A  weighted  average  of  EC-9  member  countries  consumer  price 
indices,  using  wheat  consumption  shar§1  as  weights,  crop  year, 
calendar  year  1980=100  (I.M.F.  1984). 
CPI.BE  Consumer  price  index  fOb/Belgium,  crop  year,  calendar  year 
1980=100  (I.M.F.,  1984). 
CPI.DE  Consumer  price  index  fOb/Denmark,  crop  year,  calendar  year 
1980=100  (I.M.F.,  1984). 
; 
CPI.FR  Consumer  p~ice  index  fgy  France,  crop  year,  calendar  year 






Consumer  price  index  fOb/Ireland,  crop  year,  calendar  year 
1980=100  (I.M.F.,  1984). 
Consumer  price  index  fEY  Italy,  crop  year,  calendar  year 
1980=100  (r.M.F.,  1984). 
Consumer  price  index  forb1etherlands,  crop  year,  calendar  year 
1980=100  (I.M.F.,  1984). 
Consumer  price  index  for  Unitg9  Kingdom,  crop  year,  calendar 
year  1980=100  (I.M.F.,  1984). 
Consumer  price  index  for  West/Germany,  crop  year,  calendar 
year  1980=100  (I.M.F.,  1984). 
CSTIN.BE  Prices  paid  for  production requisites,  Belgium,  calendar  year 
1980=1.00  (F.A.O.;  Eurostat).  NOTE:  Data are  from  F.A.O. 
until  1974  and  from  Eurostat  (1983)  for  good  and  services 
currently consumed  in agriculture since  1975. 
CSTIN.DE  Prices  paid  for  production requisites,  Denmark,  calendar  year 
1980=1.00  (F .A.O.). 
CSTIN.FR  Prices  paid  for  production requisites,  France,  calendar  year 
1980=1.00  (F.A.O.). 
CSTIN.ID  Prices  paid  for  production requisites,  Ireland,  calendar  year 
1980=1.00  (F.A.O.). 
CSTIN.IT  Prices  paid  for  production requ1s1tes,  Italy,  calendar  year 
1980=1.00  (F.A.O.;  Eurostat).  NOTE:  Data are  from F.A.O. 
until  1974  and  from  Eurostat  (1983)  for  goods  and  services 
currently consumed  in agriculture since  1975. 
CSTIN.NE  Prices  paid  for  production requisites,  Netherlands,  calendar 
year  1980-1.00  (F.A.O.). 
CSTIN.UK  Prices  paid  for  fertilizer,  United  Kingdom,  calendar  year 
1980=1.00  (F.A.O.). 
CSTIN.WG  Prices  paid  for  production requisites,  West  Germany,  calendar 





Wheat,  denaturing  premium,  crop  year,  ECU/mt  (CAP  Monitor).al 
Statistical  discrepancy  variable  used  to 
errors  in the wheat  supply-demand  identity, 
Calculated using  equation 3.13. 
account  for  any 
crop  year,  mmt. 
Statistical  discrepancy  variable  used  to  account  for  the 
difference  in net  wheat  exports  based  on  July-June  and August-
July crop  years,  mmt.  Calculated using  equation 3.14. 
Variable  measuring  the difference between wheat  and  barley intervention  prices, 
equation  3.18. 
57 
crop  year,  ECU/mt.a/  Calculated  using 
DIWH  Discrepancy  variable  to  account  for  the  difference  in  wheat 
production  in  the  EC-6  and  EC-10  between  1968/69  and  1972/73, 
and  zero  thereafter. 
DY  A  weighted  average  of  EC-9  member  countries  indices  of 
personal  consumption  expenditures  divided  by  the  consumer 
price  index,  using  wheat  consumption  sh~fes as weights,  crop 
year,  calendar year  1980  = 1.00  (I.M.F.) 
D74  A zero-one  variable  equal  to  one  in  1974 and  zero  otherwise. 
D76  A zero-one  variable  equal  to one  in 1976  and  zero otherwise. 
D7682  A  zero-one variable representing  the  introduction  of  the  silo 
system,  equal  to  one  from  1967/68  to  1975/76  and  zero 
thereafter. 
EXCHRECU  Rate  of  exchange  between  the  European  Currency Unit  and  tg1 
U.S.  dollar,  crop  year,  ECU/dollar  (Eurostat,  1983;  I.M.F.). 
EXRGR.BE  Belgium,  ¥reen rate 
Monitor).  a 
of exchange,  crop  year,  francs/ECU  (CAP 
EXRGR.DE  Denmark,  a¥reen rate of exchange,  crop  year,  kroner/ECU  (CAP 
Monitor) • 
EXRGR.FR  France,  §feen rate of  exchange,  crop  year,  francs/ECU  (CAP 
Monitor). 
EXRGR.ID  Ireland,  a¥reen rate of  exchange,  crop  year,  pounds/ECU  (CAP 
Monitor) • 
EXRGR.IT  Italy,  gr1en  rate  of exchange, 
Monitor).  a 
crop  year,  lire/ECU  (CAP 
EXRGR.NE  Netherlands,  §feen rate of exchange,  crop year,  guilders/ECU 
(CAP  Monitor). 
EXRGR.UK  United  KingdomA /  green rate of  exchange,  crop  year,  pounds/ECU 
(CAP  Monitor). 
EXRGR.WG  West  Germany,  /green rate of exchange,  crop  year,  marks/ECU 
(CAP  Monitor).  a 
EXRGR9  A  weighted  average of  EC-9  member  countries  indices of  green 
rates  of exchange,  using wheat  production ,hares as  weights, 
crop  year,  1972  = 1.00,  (CAP  Monitor).a  NOTE:  For  the 
United  Kingdom,  Ireland  and  Denmark  the values  for  their green 
rates  of  exchange were  set equal to  the  1972/73 value  for  the 














Producer  price of  hogs,  Belgium,  national currency per metric 
ton,  crop  year  (Herlihy et  a1. ). 
Producer  price of  hogs,  Denmark,  national  currency per metric 
ton,  crop  year  (Herlihy et a1.). 
Producer  price of hogs,  France,  national  currency per metric 
ton,  crop  year  (Herlihy et a1.). 
Producer price of hogs,  Ireland,  national  currency per metric 
ton,  crop year  (Herlihy et a1.). 
Producer  price of hogs,  Italy,  national  currency per metric 
ton,  crop  year  (Herlihy et a1.). 
Producer  price of  hogs,  Netherlands,  national  currency  per 
metric  ton,  crop  year  (Herlihy et al.Y. 
Producer  price of  hogs,  United  Kingdom,  national  currency per 
metric  ton,  crop  year  (Herlihy et' al.). 
Producer price of  hogs,  West  Germany,  national  currency  per 
metric  ton,  crop  year  (Herlihy et al.). 
The  difference  between  the  EC  import  price for  wheat  and  the 
U.S.  export  price  for  wheat,  crop  year,  dollars/mt. 
Calculated according  to  equation 3.48. 
A  weighted  average  of EC-9  member  countries  indices  of  per 
capita  personal  consumption  expenditures deflated  by  their 
consumer  price  indices,  using wheat  consumption  sErres  as 
weights,  crop  year,  calendar year  1980=1.00  (I.M.F.). 
Population  in the EC-lO,  crop  year, millions  (I.M.F.).b/ 
Variable  to  account  for  the difference between  beginning  of 
the  year  threshold prices and  the  crop  year average  threshold 
price which  includes  the monthly  storage  increment,  crop  year 
(CAP  Monitor;  Commission  of  the  European  Communities, 
Ag-;rcultural Markets). 
A linear  time  trend equal  to  60  in  1960,  61  in 1961,  etc. 
a/  Variables  reported  in units of account until 1978/79 were  converted 
to  ECU's  using  the  annual  UA/ECU  exchange  rates  reported  in 
Eurostat,  1981. 
b/  Crop  year  data  is  approximated  by  taking  0.417  of  the; current 
calendar year plus  0.583  of  the next  calendar year. 
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Appendix  II 
Calculation  of  the  Excess  Demand  Curve  for  Wheat  Facing  the  EEC 
The  appropriate  expression  for  the  elasticity of  export  demand  for 
a  commodity  is  (Bredahl,  l-teyers  and  Collins;  Cronin): 
where  N  ef  1S 
[ 
d  Qd'  Q  . 
_L  N.E.-_1_N.Es'~J' 
Nef  - i  d1  p1  Qef  S1  p1  Qef 
the  elasticity of  export  de~and,  N  .  are  the  Sl 
elasticities of  domestic  demand  and  supply  in country  i;  Qd'  and  Q  .  are 
1  Sl 
the  .th  ,  I  I  f  d  d  d  I  1  country seve  0  eman  an  supp  y,  and  Qef  is  the  level  of 
EC  exports.  The  elasticities of  price  transmission  (response  of  the  ith 
country's  price  to  changes  in  the  EC  export  price,  which  is  assumed  to 
d  s 
the  world  (U.S.)  export  price)  are  E  .  for  demand  prices  and  E  . 
pl  pl  equal 
for  supply  prices.  Using  the  five  year  average  supply/demand  balance 
sheet  reported  ln  Table  A.l  and  the  estimates  for  the  various 
elasticities reported  1n  Table  A.2,  the  derived  excess  demand  elasticity 
for  wheat  facing  the  EC  (using  the  above  formula)  was  19.9  (and  forms 
the  basis  for  the  coefficient on  price  in  equation  (3.46».  This 
elasticity was  calculated  by  assuming  that  20  percent  of  world  wheat  is 
consumed  as  livestock  feed  and  this  demand  is  evenly  distributed across 
all regions  with a  demand  elasticity of -1.5. 
.. Appendix  Table  A.l 
Wheat  Trade,  Consumption  and  Production,  5  year Average:  Crop  Years  1978-79  to  1982-63  (000  metric  tonnes) 
Production  Exports  Imports  Net  Exports  Consumption* 
------_._----- --------------------- --------------- EC  53,690  11,675  4,404  7,270  46,692 
Western  Europe  (excl.  EC)  12,860  1,679  2,508  -829  13 ,689 
Eastern  Europe  27,7/.9  1,827  4,906  -3,079  30,828 
USSR  94,865  956  14,281  -13,325  108,190 
Canada  21,816  15,856  55  15,801  6,015 
USA  64,746  39,950  18  39,932  24,814 
North  & Central America  (excl.  Canada  & USA)  3,156  7  3,419  -3,412  6,513 
Argentina  9,456  4,748  1.,747  4,709 
Brazil  2,458  4,186  -4,186  6,644 
South  America  (exel.  Argentina  & Brazil)  1,372  18  3,855  -3,837  5,209 
China  59,968  11,322  -11,322  71,290 
India  34,517  237  1,571  -1,340  35,857 
Indonesia  1,423  -1,423  1,423 
Japan  564  27  5,664  -5,637  6,201 
Asia  (exel.  China,  India,  Indonesia  & Japan)  41,734  861  15,752  -14,891  56,625 
Egypt  1,908  5,930  -5,930  7,838 
Africa  (exel.  Egypt)  7,100  98  8,928  -8,830  15,930 
Australia  14,079  10,727  10,727  3,352 
Oeeonia  (e~cl. Australia)  325  215  -214  528 
Uorld-Tot~i  ex~·i;ding  intr-;E"C  trad;-------452~360  89,730  89,730  o  452,360 
------- ._  ........ _---- ... _----------------.----.-----.-... -
*  DOQestic  disappearance  including  change  in  stocks. 
Source:  World  Wheat  Statistics  (Annual),  International  Wheat  Council  (various  issues). 
0- o Appendix  Table  A.2 
Supply,  Demand  and  Domestic-World  Price Transmission  Elasticities  for  Food  ~Iheat 
EC 
Western  Europe  (eKcl.  EC) 




Horth  &  Cent ra I  America  (exc 1.  Canada  &  USA) 
Argentina 
Braz it 





Asia  (excl.  China,  India,  Indonesia  & Japan) 
Egypt 
Africa  (excl.  Egypt) 
Austra lia 
Oceania  (excl.  Australia) 
-----_._-,-------------
* With  respect  to  domestic  prices. 
Elasticity 










































Transmission  Elasticity 
Demand  Supply 
0.3  0.3 
0.3  0.3 
0.3  0.3 
0.3  0.3 
0.7  0.9 
0.9  0.7 
0.5  0.7 
0.9  0.7 
0.9  0.7 
0.9  0.9 
0.3  0.3 
0.3  0.3 
0.9  0.9 
0.2  0.2 
0.5  0.3 
0.1  0.3 
0.5  0.3 
0.5  0.9 
0.5  0.9 
------------------
0- ..... 